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Birthright Citizenship in the United
Kingdom and the United States:
A Comparative Analysis of the
Common Law Basis for Granting
Citizenship to Children Born of Illegal
Immigrants
ABSTRACT

The common law concept of territorial birthright
citizenship is the foundationfor the FourteenthAmendment's
Citizenship Clause, which confers citizenship on those born
within the United States and 'subject" to its 'jurisdiction."
Likewise territorial underpinnings were the basis for over
375 years of birthright citizenship within the United
Kingdom. Contemporary discourse with respect to territorial
birthrightcitizenship, however, has shifted from its common
law basis and now focuses on whether citizenship ought to
inhere in children born to illegal immigrants. In the United
Kingdom, the British Nationality Act of 1981 abandoned
territorial birthright citizenship in favor of parentage based
citizenship. The United States, however, while adopting the
English common law concept of territorial birthright
citizenship embodied in the Fourteenth Amendment to the
U.S. Constitution, has never definitively articulated its
position on children born to illegal immigrants.
Social and political controversy over the influx of illegal
immigrants has increased activity aimed at altering the
doctrine of territorial birthright citizenship. Efforts in the
United States to legislatively redefine the Citizenship Clause
to exclude children born to illegal immigrants from United
States citizenship have failed and are probably
unconstitutionalshould they succeed. This can be contrasted
with the restriction of citizenship in those born to illegal
immigrants. While the common law basis of the U.K.'s
departurefrom territorialbirthright citizenship is exemplified
under 'Parliamentary Supremacy," legislative alteration of
the U.S. common law basis of territorialbirthrightcitizenship
may not occur by directly restricting the Fourteenth
Amendment.
This Note investigates the development of territorial
birthright citizenship in the United Kingdom and the Untied
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States and critiquescontemporary efforts in the United States
to restrict citizenship of children born to illegal immigrants.
This Note concludes that while the legislative efforts in the
Untied States to restrict citizenship of children of illegal
immigrants may be an acceptable political policy, it is
unconstitutional and, therefore, other alternatives must be
explored. These alternatives,premised on Congress' broad
authority under the immigration and naturalizationpower,
are traditionally reviewed deferentially by the judiciary.
Thus, it would be far more efficacious and constructive for
opponents of territorialbirthright citizenship to concentrate
their efforts at altering current immigration and border
enforcement policies, rather than pursuing patently
unconstitutionalefforts to redefine the Citizenship Clause.
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INTRODUCTION

The common law concept of citizenship by birth within a
sovereign's territory (territorial birthright citizenship) is vital to
the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, which
confers citizenship on those born within the United States and
"subject" to its "jurisdiction."' Likewise, territorial underpinnings
were the basis for over 375 years of birthright citizenship within
the United Kingdom. 2 Contemporary discourse with respect to
territorial birthright citizenship, however, has shifted from its
common law basis and now focuses on whether citizenship
inheres in children born of illegal immigrants. 3
In both the

1.
The amendment, in relevant part, states "[alil persons born or
naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are
citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside." U.S. CONST.
amend. XIV, § 1 (ratifiedl868).
2.
English law now dictates that a person is not a British citizen by birth
unless "his father or mother is a British citizen; or settled in the United Kingdom."
British Nationality Act, 1981, ch. 61, § 1 (Eng.) [hereinafter BNA].
3.
The term "illegal immigrant" is used throughout this article to refer to a
person who is neither present in the country with government permission nor a
citizen. Scholars disagree as to the specific term that should be used for the
aforementioned persons. See Michael R. Curran, Flickering Lamp Beside the
Golden Door: Immigration, the Constitution, & Undocumented Aliens in the 1990's,
30 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 57, 59 n.21 (1998) (noting that the term "illegal" should
not be used to define "undocumented" aliens until an INS administrative
proceeding has ascertained the status to be illegal). "Immigrants" consist of all
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United Kingdom and the United States, this issue continues to
influence cutting-edge debate with respect to questions of
nationality. Furthermore, this issue has been resolved differently
in these two countries, despite a shared territorial common law
basis.
Principles grounding territorial birthright citizenship
influence contemporary discussion of how to characterize
children of illegal immigrants-that is, whether to characterize
them as citizens or aliens. In the United Kingdom, the British
Nationality Act of 1981 eradicated the last vestiges of territorial
birthright citizenship. 4 Increased political pressure to remedy the
perceived problem of increased social service costs due to
immigration ultimately led the United Kingdom to reject territorial
birthright citizenship. Likewise, contemporary political pressure
is forcing the U.S. Congress to address the issues of territorial
birthright citizenship and illegal immigration along with the
attendant costs and benefits. The United States, while adopting
the English common law concept of territorial birthright
citizenship in the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S.
Constitution, has never definitively articulated its position on
children born of illegal immigrants. The question thus remains
5
whether these children are citizens of the United States.
Social and political controversy over the influx of illegal
immigrants in the United States and the United Kingdom have
increased activity aimed at altering the doctrine of territorial
birthright citizenship. Most opponents of territorial birthright
citizenship seek to proscribe illegal immigrants' children from
becoming citizens merely by virtue of birth within a country's
geographic boundaries. While efforts to legislatively redefine
citizenship by birth within the United States have failed and are
probably unconstitutional should they succeed, the United
Kingdom abolished pure territorial birthright citizenship, thus
denying citizenship to children of illegal immigrants. However,

aliens (those who are not citizens or nationals) except those falling into specific
classifications (e.g., foreign diplomats and diplomatic staff, aliens having
residences in foreign countries and having no intention of abandoning these
residences, and transitory aliens passing through the country). See 8 U.S.C. §
1101(15) (1994). A non-citizen may be a "national" and therefore not an
"immigrant" under current law. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(3), (21) (1994) (a national is
a person owing "permanent allegiance to a state").
4.
BNA, § 1.
5.
See Jonathan C. Drimmer, The Nephews of Uncle Sam: The History,
Evolution, and Application of Birthright Citizenship in the United States, 9 GEO.
IMMIGR. L.J. 667, 671 (1995) (noting the legal status of American-born children of
illegal immigrants is "uncertain"); see also Dan Stein & John Bauer, Interpreting
the 14th Amendment: Automatic Citizenship for Children of Illegal Immigrants, 7
STAN. L. & POLy' REV. 127, 128 (1996) (noting neither the U.S. Supreme Court nor
the U.S. Constitution has answered the question whether children of illegal
immigrants are citizens).
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while the common law basis of the United Kingdom's departure
from territorial birthright citizenship is exemplified under
"Parliamentary Supremacy," legislative alteration of the U.S.'
common law basis of territorial birthright citizenship may not
occur by restricting the definition of citizenship in the Fourteenth
Amendment. This conclusion introduces a dichotomy between
United States and United Kingdom legal paradigms"Parliamentary Supremacy" in the United Kingdom provides a
constitutional basis to legislatively alter territorial birthright
citizenship, while limits on Congress' enforcement power under §
5 of the Fourteenth Amendment and separation of powers
doctrine reject such an outcome in the United States.
Part II of this Note will investigate the development of
territorial birthright citizenship both in the United Kingdom and
the United States. Part III will discuss the status of children born
of illegal immigrants within these two countries. Additionally,
Part III will examine and critique contemporary efforts in the
United States to restrict citizenship of children born of illegal
immigrants. Finally, Part IV will conclude that while the
legislative efforts of the United States to restrict citizenship of
children of illegal immigrants may be acceptable as a political
policy, it is unconstitutional and therefore other alternatives must
be explored.
These alternatives, while not focused on the
Fourteenth Amendment's Citizenship Clause, impute broad
congressional authority under the immigration and naturalization
power. The impact of these alternatives affects any person
considering entering the United States.
II.

CONFERRING CITIZENSHIP BY BIRTHRIGHT IN ANGLO-AMERICAN LAW

The principle of territorial birthright citizenship is the basis
for citizenship law in both the United Kingdom and the United
States. The U.K.'s reasons for ultimately rejecting the territorial
basis of birthright citizenship in 1981 provide a useful reference
point to compare against the continued adherence by the United
States to territorial birthright citizenship. Additionally, because
U.S. common law is rooted in English jurisprudence, analysis of
the early history and development of territorial birthright
citizenship in the United Kingdom is useful to provide a more
complete understanding of the concept's application in the United
States.
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The United Kingdom's ProgressToward Conferring
Birthright CitizenshipBased on Lineage
of the Parent

Under the British Nationality Act of 1981 (BNA), the U.K.'s
rule of birthright citizenship changed from common law territorial
birthright, whereby the place of birth determined citizenship, to
one founded on the parent's citizenship. 6 The foundation of the
common law, while contrary to current British policy, establishes
both the U.K.'s historical frame of reference for its ultimate
rejection of the territorial birthright principle and the theoretical
underpinning of the U.S. Constitution's Fourteenth Amendment
Citizenship Clause.
1. Exposition of the Territorial Birthright Citizenship Principle:
Calvin's Case
Calvin v. Smith (Calvin's Case), decided in 1608, established
the seminal exposition of territorial birthright citizenship. 7 The
question in Calvin's Case was "whether Robert Calvin ...
(being
born in Scotland since the Crown of England descended to His
Majesty) be an alien born, and consequently disabled to bring any
real or personal action for any lands within the realm of
England."s Prior to Calvin's birth, 9 the crown of England passed
to Scotland's King James IV.
The defendants posited that
because the king held the crowns of England, Scotland, Ireland,
and France, and had several distinct political capacities in several
kingdoms, the ligeance' 0 of each separate political unit was

6.
BNA, § 1.
7.
77 Eng. Rep. 377 (K.B. 1608) fhereinafter Calvin's Case]. This case
was heard by all the justices of the King's Bench and Common Pleas, as well as
the Lord Chancellor and barons of the Exchequer-14 justices in all. See Polly J.
Price, Natural Law and Birthright Citizenship in Calvin's Case, 9 YALE J.L. &
HUMAN. 73, 82 (1997). All but two justices found in favor of Calvin. See id. While
Calvin's Case embodies the quintessential explanation of common law territorial
birthright citizenship, some historians have asserted that the concept dates back
as early as 1290, in the case of Elyas de Rababyn. See id. at 92 n. 109. (noting the
rule was assumed to be that all persons born on English soil were the King's
subjects). In Elyas, it was assumed that all persons born on English soil were the
king's subjects. See id. (citing 9 W.S. HOLDswORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 75
(1926)).
8.
See Calvin's Case, 77 Eng. Rep. at 379.
9.
See id. Robert Calvin was born on November 5, in the third year of
King James' reign, which began in 1603. See id.
10.
Ligeance is "true and faithful obedience ... to his Sovereign" due by a
subject from birth. Id. at 382. The term ligeance, however, signifies a mutual
relationship between the monarch and the subject because the monarch is
obligated to maintain and defend his subjects. See Price, supra note 7, at 83-84
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"several and divided."" Therefore, according to the defendants,
Calvin was an alien 12 to James's crown in England, though not in
Scotland, 3and unable to seek redress in English court for land in
England.'
Lord Coke, writing for the court, rejected the defendants'
argument. 14
He determined that persons born in Scotland
subsequent to the English crown's descent to James IV of
Scotland were not aliens in England but natural born subjects.' 5
The characterization of Calvin as a natural born subject was
quintessentially territorial:
There be regularly three incidents to a subject born. 1. That the
parents be under the actual obedience 1 6 of the King's dominion. 2.
That the place of birth be within the King's dominion. And 3. The
time of his birth . . . for he cannot be a subject born of one
kingdom, albeit afterwards one kingdom descend to the king of the
other. 17

(analogizing the concept of ligeance to that of a master-servant or parent-child
relationship). Functionally, this suggests a paternalistic theory of governance.
See PETER SCHUCK & ROGERS M. SMITH, CITIZENSHIP WITHOUT CONSENT 30 (1985)
(arguing that mutual consent is a component of birthright citizenship).
Additionally, the common law exceptions to territorial birthright are important to
the concept of ligeance because these concepts define "obedience" and impute a
territorial basis to the concept of ligeance. See Calvin's Case, 77 Eng. Rep. at 399;
see also infra notes 16, 145 and accompanying text.
11.
Calvin's Case, 77 Eng. Rep. at 399; see also infra note 14.
12.
An "alien" was defined in Calvin's Case as a "subject that is born out of
the ligeance of the King and under the ligeance of another." 77 Eng. Rep. at 396.
An alien cannot bring an action for or concerning land. See id.
13.
See id.
14.
The defendants argued King James had two capacities, a "natural
body" as a descendent of the royal blood line, and a 'politic body" identified
separately with each kingdom under his dominion. Id. at 388-89. According to
the defendants, Calvin was not a subject of King James' realm of England because
Calvin was not under the ligeance of the king's body politic in England. See id. at
389. Rather, Calvin was a subject of James' body politic in Scotland. See
generally Price, supra note 7, at 85-86 (discussing the concept of the king's two
bodies).
15.
Until the mid-twentieth century, England recognized two forms of
"presence" for a person within the territory of England-either "alien" or "subject"
status. See id. at 86. A subject owed allegiance to the monarch, whereas an
alien, while not per se an enemy of the monarch was "born in a strange country."
Id.
A "natural born subject" was, obviously, one born into the monarch's
allegiance by birth in England or in one of the territories held by the monarch. Id.
at 87.
16.
Though it may superficially appear otherwise, this component is also
territorial. Actual obedience requires 'actual possession" by the king of part of
his kingdom. Calvin's Case, 77 Eng. Rep. at 399 ("the first is termed actual
obedience, because, though the King of England hath absolute right to other
kingdoms or dominions ... yet seeing the King is not in actual possession thereof,
none born there since the Crown of England was out of actual possession thereof,
are subjects to the King of England") (emphasis added).
17.
Id.
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Accordingly, Coke found that Calvin fell within this model, for
"Calvin was born under the King's power or protection; ergo he is
no alien."' 8 Therefore, Calvin could assert a claim to inherit land
within England.
Calvin's Case directs the analysis toward a territorial
understanding of birthright citizenship, under both British and
U.S. law. 19
Historically, however, the concept of territorial
birthright citizenship was practical. The rationale for territorial
birthright citizenship has its basis in the feudal system of early
England, where ligeance to a king or lord was a component of the
feudal relationship. 20 The feudal system engraved into English
governance

the concept of jus soli,2 ' the formulation

of a

citizenship rule founded not on heredity or parentage but
territorial birthright. 2 2 Lord Coke acknowledged this basis in
explaining the mutual relationship
of the ligeance owed by the
23
sovereign and the subject.

The common law rationale for territorial birthright citizenship
embraces two corollary prohibitions limiting territorial birthright
citizenship. The first prohibits children born of the Crown's
enemies within the Crown's realm during time of hostility from
becoming subjects; the second prohibits "issues" from foreign
ministers or consuls, born in the Crown's realm, from becoming
subjects. 24 These corollaries are components of the concept of
ligeance described in Calvin's Case. As Lord Coke noted, "any
place within the King's dominions without obedience can never
produce a natural subject."25
Thus, under certain
circumstances, birth within the de facto territory of the sovereign
will not lead to status as a natural born subject.
Coincidentally, Lord Coke's opinion indicates that the
parent's nationality does not negatively impact the status of the

18.
Id. at 407.
19.
See Price, supranote 7, at 74 (noting Calvin's Case is the basis for the
U.S. common law rule of territorial birthright citizenship).
20.
See id. at 78 n.20 (quoting John W. Salmond, Citizenship and
Allegiance:Nationality in English Law, 18 L. Q. REV. 49, 53 (1902)); see also supra
note 10.
21.
See infra note 67 and accompanying text.
22.
See Price, supra note 7, at 78 n.20.
23.
Calvin's Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 382 (noting that ligeance is akin to the
connection "between lord and tenant that holdeth by homage' and the "King is
called the liege lord of his subjects"). As explained supra in note 10, ligeance is
implicitly territorial in nature.
24.
See id. at 384 ("for if enemies should come into the realm, and possess
town or fort, and have issue there, that issue is no subject of the King of England
though he be born upon his soil"), 399 ("if any of the King's ambassadors in
foreign nations have children... they are natural born subjects [of England], yet
they are born out of the King's dominion").
25.
Id. at 399; see also SCHUCK & SMITH, supra note 10, at 13 (discussing
the limitation of "consent" on the ascriptive principle of territorial birthright).
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"issue," so long as the parent does not fit into one of the
prohibited categories. 2 6
While the parent's ligeance may be
"momentary and uncertain," there is sufficient obedience that a
child will be a natural born subject. 2 7
This creates an
opportunity for plausible subscription to the theory that children
of illegal immigrants are thus citizens by fact of birth within the
territory. However, Lord Coke noted that while the parent's
nationality itself may not be decisive of the child's claim of status
as a natural born subject, apparently the amity of the parent may
be important. 28 The concept of amity has lead some scholars to
question whether a child of an illegal immigrant parent can
become a citizen under the general rule of territorial birthright
29
citizenship.
Calvin's Case stands for the proposition that, with certain
limited exceptions founded on a ligeance requirement, a child
born within a sovereign's territory is a sovereign's subject, or, in
modern parlance, a citizen. This concept, which is the law
followed in the United States, has been rejected in England.
2. Abdication of British Common Law Territorial Birthright
Citizenship
Passage of the BNA resulted in abdication of the common law
rule of territorial birthright citizenship, replacing territorial
birthright citizenship with a parentage requirement.3 0 Under the

26.
See Calvin's Case, 77 Eng. Rep. at 399 (finding that despite the
parent's transitory status, a child born in the realm of the sovereign has the
status of natural born subject).
27.
Id.
28.
See id. at 384 (discussing a case where a Frenchman "in amity with the
King, came to England . .. [and] he owed the King local obedience ...
[though]
being but momentary and uncertain, is yet strong enough to make a natural
subject, for if he hath issue here, that issue is a natural born subject") (emphasis
added).
29.
See generally SCHUCK & SMITH, supra note 10.
Schuck's basic
argument is that amity and the two traditional common law exceptions to
citizenship by territorial birthright lean toward establishing a higher threshold
than mere birth as a measure of whether citizenship should be conferred on
children of illegal immigrants. See id. at 14. Schuck would utilize a consent
component, whereby the sovereign's consent or lack thereof to an immigrant
would help determine the citizenship status of a child born to immigrants within a
country's territory. See id. at 94. Ostensibly, this would serve to exclude children
born of illegal immigrants, since their presence is not consented to by the
sovereign. This theory has particular difficulty describing just what consent
means. This subject will be discussed in greater detail, infra Part III.B. 1.
30.
Statutory regulation largely superseded Calvin's Case after 1844. See
JAMES H. KETTNER, THE DEVELOPMENT OF AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP, 1608-1870, 7 n. 13
(1978). In certain contexts, however, Lord Coke's opinion in Calvin's Case was
still considered authoritative. See Isaacson v. Durant, 17 Q.B. 54 (1886); Attorney
General v. Prince Ernest Agustus of Hanover, App. Cas. 636 (1957). Previous
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BNA, a person born within the United Kingdom is not a British
citizen by birth unless the person's father or mother is either a
British citizen or settled in the United Kingdom. 3 ' The BNA is
important for several reasons, among which is the elimination of
the common law's territorial basis for birthright citizenship. 3 2
Before addressing the BNA in detail, however, it is worthwhile to
mention previous legislation and several factors motivating the
BNA's passage.
The reason that the United Kingdom abdicated territorial
birthright citizenship after 375 years is multifaceted.
One
purported reason was the increase in anti-immigrant sentiment
in the United Kingdom following World War 1J.33 Throughout the
1960s, 1970s, and 1980s, the United Kingdom continued to
harbor protest of the immigration of many non-white
immigrants.3 4 The multiplicity of political, social, and economic
factors contributing to the increase in anti-immigrant sentiment
ultimately led to a series of alterations in the United Kingdom's
citizenship laws.3 5 The British Parliament passed four major

superseding statutes did not alter, to a great extent, birthright citizenship in the
United Kingdom.
Because this Note is concerned with contemporary issues
affecting birthright citizenship, earlier statutory manifestations of citizenship are
beyond the scope of this Note.
31.
See BNA, § 1, cl. (1). The BNA in relevant part reads:
A person born in the United Kingdom after commencement shall be a
British citizen if at the time of birth his father or mother is a British
citizen; or settled in the United Kingdom.
Id.
32.
Substantive changes to British law are also the result of complicated
definitional distinctions that will be discussed infra, with respect to the terms
"British citizen" and "settled."
33.
See ZIG LAYTON-HENRY, THE POLITICS OF IMMIGRATION: IMMIGRATION
"RACE" AND "RACE" RELATIONS IN POST-WAR BRITAIN 22-41 (1992). Layton-Henry
argues there were several factors contributing to this anti-immigrant sentiment.
Racism against non-white immigrants, fears of job loss to cheap labor, and a
downturn in the economy all heightened the tension in Britain toward immigrants.
See id. at 22. The end of World War II brought a large influx of immigrants to
Britain, which for several years after the war offered an open door policy toward
immigrants. See Kevin C. Wilson, Note, And Stay Out! The Dangersof Using AntiImmigrant Sentiment as a Basis for Social Policy: America Should Take Heed of
DisturbingLessons From Great Britain's Past, 24 GA. J. INTL & COMP. L. 567, 568
(1995). Part of the initial rationale for accepting high levels of immigration was
due to post-war labor shortages and damage from the war-Britain simply needed
labor to rebuild. See id.
34.
See generally id. (providing analysis of social and political forces
contributing to British immigration reform measures). Wilson argues the prime
motivating factor with respect to alterations in British immigration and citizenship
law is racism.
See id. at 568.
Significant immigration from British
Commonwealth colonies, from where many non-white immigrants emigrated, was
reported as a source of conflict. See id. at 569-70.
35.
Economic factors, such as high unemployment in the post-World War
II years, coupled with immigrants willing to work longer hours for less pay than
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immigration laws: the Commonwealth Immigrants Act of 1962
(1962 Act), the Commonwealth Immigrants Act of 1968 (1968
Act), the Immigration Act of 1971 (1971 Act), and the BNA was
passed in 1981.
The 1962 Act restricted "the immigration of all holders of
Commonwealth passports except those born in the UK, those
holding UK passports issued by the UK government, and those
included on the passport of a person exempt from immigration
control under the first two exceptions."3 6
The government
required immigrants not falling within one of these three
categories to have a voucher issued by the Ministry of Labour
37
before they were granted permission to enter the country.
38
Gaps in the 1962 Act precipitated passage of the 1968 Act.
The 1968 Act restricted immigration of Asians with British
passports. 3 9 The 1968 Act asserted power to enforce immigration
controls over any citizen of the United Kingdom or its colonies
having a passport issued by the British government. 4 °
This
regulation applied to all citizens of the United Kingdom "unless
they, or at least one parent or grandparent, had been born,
adopted or naturalized in the UK, or registered as a citizen of the
UK or its colonies." 4 ' Thus, under the 1968 Act, there were two

British nationals, lead to calls for immigration reform. See id. at 570. Politicians
in the United Kingdom seized on this anti-immigrant tension and ran on antiimmigrant platforms.
See id. at 572.
For example, the Conservative Tory
candidate Peter Griffiths actively campaigned under the anti-immigrant and
patently racist slogan "If you want a nigger neighbor, vote Labour." Id. at 572
n.40. Significant anti-immigrant hostility was directed at African countries, such
as Nigeria and Kenya. Id. at 573.
36.
Commonwealth Immigrants Act, 1962, ch. 21, § 2 (Eng.).
37.
See Wilson, supra note 33, at 585.
Evidence suggests these
restrictions did in fact reduce immigration from Asian and Caribbean
Commonwealth countries. In 1964, 26,153 unskilled labor applications were
processed from individuals of Indian nationality; the Department of Labour issued

only 550 vouchers.

See id. at 585 n.135 (citing COLIN HOLMES, A TOLERANT

COUNTRY? IMMIGRANTS, REFUGEES, AND MINORITIES IN BRITAIN 46 (1991)). That same

year, out of 19,292 Pakistani applications, only 532 were issued vouchers. See id.
38.
The problems inherent in the 1962 Act became apparent in 1967, when
a large number of Asian immigrants with British passports fled prosecution in
Kenya. These Asian passport holders were not covered by the 1962 Act, and
therefore were not within the 1962 Act's immigration controls. See id. at 586
(noting as British passport holders, these Asian immigrants were considered to be
citizens of the United Kingdom under the 1962 Act).
39.
See Commonwealth Immigrants Act, 1968, § 1 (Eng.).
40.
See id.
41.
Id. § 2(A).
Some commentators cite this change as evidence of
continued racist intentions under the guise of immigration policy. See Wilson,
supra note 33, at 586; see also DAVID STEEL, No ENTRY: THE BACKGROUND AND
IMPLICATIONS OF THE COMMONWEALTH IMMIGRATION ACTS 137 (1969). In a February
1968 speech, conservative politician Duncan Sandys argued for tougher
immigration laws, but advocated exceptions for New Zealanders and Australians
because "they have got white faces." Id.
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categories of citizens-those subject to immigration controls and
those who were not.4 2
The 1971 Act complimented the restrictions embodied in the
1962 and 1968 Acts. It established the British government's
complete control over the immigration of people, without a close
connection to the United Kingdom by either birth or descent, who
were referred to as "non-patrials" in the 1971 Act.4 Under the
1971 Act, patrials had the right to abode in the United Kingdom,
whereas non-patrials did not.44
Additionally, the 1971 Act
replaced the voucher with a temporary work permit, which,
unlike the voucher, did not carry the right of permanent
45
residence.
The BNA further restricted Commonwealth immigration by
ending the common law principle of territorial birthright
citizenship, thus limiting British citizenship to those with close
ties to the United Kingdom. 46 The BNA abolished the single
citizenship category of "citizen of the United Kingdom and
Colonies" and replaced it with three citizenship categories: British
citizenship, 4 7 British Dependent Territories citizenship, and
British Overseas citizenship. 48 Of these categories, only British
citizens have the right to "abode" in the United Kingdom. 4 9 The
definition of British citizenship is intended to comprise only those
whose claim to British nationality arises from a connection with
the United Kingdom, rather than from any other territory where
the Crown is responsible. 5 0
While several methods of acquiring British citizenship are
detailed in the BNA, 5 1 its impact on territorial birthright
citizenship is particularly noteworthy. In this regard, the BNA
rejects the purely territorial emphasis and instead adds a
parentage component to birthright citizenship.5 2 The parentage

42.
See Wilson, supra note 33, at 587.
43.
See Immigration Act, 1971, ch. 77 (Eng.).
44.
See id. at § 2(1)(a).
45.
See Wilson, supranote 33, at 587.
46.
See id. at 588.
47.
See infra note 49 and accompanying text.
48.
See 4(2) LORD HAILSHAM OF ST. MARYLEBONE, HALSBURY'S LAWS OF
ENGLAND 3, British Nationality, Immigration and Race Relations, pt. I, para. 1(1)
(4th ed., 1992).
49.
See id. at para. 1(2). The right to abode is the right to live in the United
Kingdom and to come and go without restriction. See id. at para. 64. While the
right to abode is part of immigration and not nationality law, it has an inherent
component of citizenship, as one cannot abode in the United Kingdom without
British citizenship. See id.
50.
See id. at para. 12.
51.
British citizenship may be conferred by birth (with an additional
parentage requirement), descent, or other form of naturalization under the BNA.
See generally,BNA, §§ 1, 2, 3, 6, 7.
52.
See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
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component requires the "father or mother5 3 [be] a British citizen
or settled 4 in the United Kingdom." s This is a major policy shift
from the territorial basis established in Calvin's Case,5 6 because
57
prior to the BNA, every person born in the United Kingdom
acquired British nationality.5 8 The only exceptions to this rule
were for the traditional common law exclusions of children born
of diplomats or of enemy aliens in the Crown's enemy-occupied
59

territory.
The term "settled" under this section of the BNA is defined
such that a child is not a British citizen if born of a parent in
violation of British immigration laws. 60 Thus, not only does the
BNA fundamentally alter the traditional common law concept of
birth within the territory as the basis for conferring citizenship,
but it categorically excludes those in the United Kingdom who are
termed "illegal immigrants."
B.

U.S. TerritorialBirthrightCitizenship

The American method of conferring citizenship to those born
within the United States is built on the foundation of English
common law.6 1 The English common law notions of allegiance
within a sovereign's jurisdiction played an integral part in the
development of the English system of territorial birthright
citizenship. 6 2
Likewise, common law concepts traversed the
Atlantic and were incorporated in the U.S. understanding of
citizenship. American citizenship development can be placed into
two historical categories: pre-Fourteenth Amendment and postFourteenth Amendment. The pre-Fourteenth Amendment period

53.
A man is regarded as a father only of his legitimate children, while a
woman is taken to be the mother of all children born to her. See HAILSHAM, supra
note 48, para. 14 n.5.
54.
The term "settled" requires the person reside in the United Kingdom,
without being subject under British immigration laws to any restriction on the
period for which the person may remain. See BNA, ch. 61, § 50(2).
55.
Id. at § 50(1).
56.
See 77 Eng. Rep. 377 (K.B. 1608).
57.
Under the BNA, the United Kingdom is defined as Great Britain,
Northern Ireland, the Channel Islands, and the Isle of Man. BNA, ch. 61, § 50(1).
58.
See HAILSHAM, supra note 48, at para. 14 n.3.
59.
See id.; see also Calvin's Case, 77 Eng. Rep. at 384, 399 (providing an
early discussion of these exclusions).
60.
See BNA, ch. 61, § 50(5).
61.
See United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 655 (1898) (quoting
Smith v. Alabama, 124 U.S. 465, 478 (1888) ("[t]here is no common law of the
United States, in the sense of a national customary law, distinct from the common
law of England.")); see also Price, supra note 7, at 73 (contending the "roots of
United States conceptions of birthright citizenship lie deep in England's medieval
past").
62.
See supra Part II.A.
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can be characterized by the courts' synthesis of English common
law into the citizenship jurisprudence of the United States. With
ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Citizenship Clause
signifies a structural recognition of common law principles; thus,
63
the effect of the Amendment is declarative, not creative.
1.

The Common Law Basis of Birthright Citizenship

The resolution of Calvin's Case,6 4 which is perhaps the most
influential enunciation by an English court of the common law
rule of territorial birthright citizenship, provides the basis for preFourteenth Amendment judiciary interpretation of citizenship
status under a territorial birthright paradigm. The importance of
Calvin's Case was its assertion of English nationality under the
common law, which was premised on the principle of "birth
within the allegiance" of the king.6 s The principle included all
persons born within the king's allegiance whether or not they
were born of alien parents. 66 The key feature of this principle is
the territorial component, for so long as one is born "within" the
allegiance of the king, one is a citizen. 6 7 There are two common
law exceptions where birth within the territory does not result in
citizenship. First, where a child is born within the territory, but
the child's parents are foreign ambassadors or diplomats, that
child is not a citizen of the territory of birth; and second, where a
child is born of alien enemies in an area of the territory under
68
hostile occupation, that child will not be a citizen.

See Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. at 676.
63.
64.
77 Eng. Rep. 377 (K.B. 1608).
65.
Id. at 383 (asserting that "they that are born under the obedience,
power, faith, ligealty, or ligiance of the King, are natural subjects, and no aliens").
66.
See Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. at 655-56 (quoting Calvin's Case, 77 Eng.
Rep. 377).
Price, supranote 7, at 77. The principle of acquiring citizenship by the
67.
mere fact of birth within the territory of a state is known as jus soil See id. The
other method of acquiring citizenship, jus sanguinis,relies on the status of at least
one parent for determining citizenship. This method of citizenship has been
established, both in the United States and United Kingdom, by statute. See id. at
78. Indeed, the concept of jus sanguinis is the basis of the U.S. Constitution's
Naturalization Clause, which states "Congress shall have the power . . . [t]o
establish an uniform Rule of Naturalization.. ." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4. A
discussion of Congress' naturalization power is generally beyond the scope of this
Note but will be pursued to the extent it may offer an alternative to eradicating
territorial birthright citizenship under the Fourteenth Amendment. See infra
notes 207-36 and accompanying text.
See Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. at 656; see also Rabang v. INS, 35 F.3d
68.
1449, 1457 n.5 (9th Cir. 1994) (noting the reason for these common law
exceptions is that persons born under these circumstances do not owe allegiance
to the sovereign nation); see also supra note 24.
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The U.S. Supreme Court has accepted the English common
law notion of territorial birthright citizenship. In Inglis v. Sailor's
Snug Harbour,69 the Court, while differing in its opinion on other
points, unanimously agreed that both English and American
courts recognized that persons born within the English colonies
of North America were natural born British subjects. 7 0 Thus,
development of the territorial birthright citizenship principle
occurring prior to ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment was
the product of judicial decisions. 7 1
It was not until the
Fourteenth Amendment's ratification that the common law ceased
to be the only source of territorial birthright citizenship. 7 2
Court decisions prior to ratification of the Fourteenth
Amendment point unambiguously to American acceptance of
territorial birthright citizenship. As early as 1804, the Supreme
Court assumed that all persons born in the United States were
citizens of the United States. 73 In The Charming Betsy, Chief
Justice Marshall stated "[wihether a person born within the United
States . . . can divest himself absolutely of that character
otherwise than in a manner as may be prescribed by law, is a
question which it is not necessary at present to decide." 74
Implicit in Justice Marshall's statement is an acknowledgment of
the common law principle of jus soli, along with its acceptance in
American jurisprudence.
Of equal import, the Court acknowledged the territorial basis
for birthright citizenship regardless of the parents' status, even if
the parents were aliens. U.S. courts accepted earlier English
commentary that found the common law settled-regardless of
whether a child's parents were English or foreign, so long as the

69.
28 U.S. 99 (1 Pet.) (1830). This case considered whether a citizen may
expatriate without sanction of the state. The key question for resolution by the
Court involved the ownership of land claimed by a child born of Irish parents in
New York prior to 1783. See id. The Supreme Court, as well as at least two
commentators, have noted the lack of clarity with respect to Inglis' holding, if
there even was one. See Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. at 659 (noting the justices
differed in their opinions on points other than citizenship); see also Price, supra
note 7, at 138 n.347 (citing Charles Gordon, The Citizen and the State: The Power
of Congress to Expatriate American Citizens, 53 GEO. L.J. 315, 321-22 (1965)
(noting Inglis "manifestly settled nothing, and the great question as to the right to
expatriate was unresolved")).
70.
28 U.S. at 120-21. This suggests that even prior to the ratification of
the constitution, that is between July 4, 1776 and 1787, there was an
understanding in the American colonies that citizenship could be secured by birth
within the territory of the British crown. See id.
71.
See Price, supra note 7, at 75.
72.
See id. at 138.
73.
See Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 120
(1804); see also Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. at 658 (noting the Court in Charming
Betsy assumed that those born in the United States were citizens).
74.
6 U.S. at 120 (emphasis added).
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child was born within the "realm," and outside of the75two common
law exceptions, the child was a subject of the crown.
In Inglis, Justice Story expounded on the Court's recognition
of territorial birthright citizenship. 7 6 He noted 'that the children
even of aliens born in a country, while the parents are there
under the protection of the government, and owing temporary
allegiance thereto, are subjects by birth."7 7 This corollary has
the Court and in fact has been upheld
never been renounced by
78
on numerous occasions.
Thus, prior to the Fourteenth Amendment's ratification,
questions of birthright citizenship were answered by referring to
the common law. After the Civil War's conclusion, new questions
arose on how to incorporate previously enslaved AfricanAmericans into the Anglo-American model of birthright
This national debate, which resulted in the
citizenship.
enactment of the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth
Amendments, also had an impact on the discussion of territorial
79
birthright citizenship.
2. Explicit Recognition of a Territorial Paradigm for Birthright
Citizenship Under the Fourteenth Amendment
The underlying theme of the Fourteenth Amendment's
citizenship clause80 is declarative, and it is not meant to
substantively alter the already well-established common law
citizenship doctrine.8 1 The Court approved this understanding in
the 1898 case Wong Kim Arlc 'as appears upon the face of the
[Fourteenth] [Ajmendment, as well as from the history of the
times, this was not intended to impose any new restrictionsupon
citizenship . . . It is declaratory in form, and enabling and

75.
See Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. at 657 (quoting Lord Chief Cockburn,
Cockb. Nat. 7 (1869)).
76.
28 U.S. at 164 (Story, J., dissenting).
77.
Id.
78.
See Miller v. Albright, 523 U.S. 420, 453, 456 (1998) (Scalia, J.,
concurring) (noting only Congress has the power to set requirements for
citizenship by persons not born in the territory of the United States); Plyler v. Doe,
457 U.S. 202, 212 (1982); Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. at 657, 674; see also United
States v. Rhodes, 27 F. Cas. 785, 789 (C.C.D. Ky. 1866) (No. 16,151) (noting that
"all persons born in the allegiance of the king are natural born subjects, and all
persons born in the allegiance of the United States are natural born citizens.
Birth and allegiance go together.").
79.
A discussion of the Reconstruction Amendments (13-15) is beyond the
scope of this Note, but will be mentioned only to the extent their passage,
ratification, and implementation are important to the concept of birthright
citizenship.
80.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
81.
See Wong Kim Ark 169 U.S. at 676.
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extending in effect."8 2 The main purpose of the Fourteenth
Amendment is to establish citizenship for free blacks, denied
such in Dred Scott v. Sanford.8 3 However, its scope is general,
"not to say universal."8 4 The only restrictions on the clause are
place, "within the United States," and jurisdiction, "subject to the

jurisdiction."83
Prior to the Fourteenth Amendment, the Civil Rights Act of
1866 (CRA),8 6 as originally drafted, prohibited state discrimination
based on "race, color or previous condition of slavery."8 7 It did not,
however, mention citizenship.8 8
Passage of the CRA was
89
predicated on the Thirteenth Amendment's enforcement clause.
Despite this constitutional basis, there were practical flaws in tying
it to the Thirteenth Amendment. 90 In an effort to save the CRA
from constitutional uncertainty-or infirmity-Senator Trumbull
introduced an amendment providing that "all persons of African
descent born in the United States are hereby declared to be citizens
of the United States. "9 1 This amendment was incorporated in the
CRA, which eventually became law. 92 The final version declared
"all persons born in the United States, and not subject to any
foreign power, excluding Indians not taxed, are hereby ...

82.
83.
84.
85.
86.

Id. (emphasis added).
60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856).
Wong Kim Ark 169 U.S. at 676.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, §1.
CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 474 (1866).

87.

Id.

citizens

88.
The Act was proposed by Senator Lyman Trumbull on January 5,
1866. See Earl M. Maltz, Citizenship and the Constitution: A History and Critique
of the Supreme Court's Alienage Jurisprudence, 28 ARIz. ST. L.J. 1135, 1140

(1996).
89.
See id. The Thirteenth Amendment was ratified December 6, 1865. In
totality, the Thirteenth Amendment states, "Neither Slavery nor involuntary

servitude, except as punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly
convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any place subject to their
jurisdiction. Congress shall have the power to enforce this article by appropriate
legislation." U.S. CONST. amend. XIII
90.
See Maltz, supra note 88, at 1140-41. The Thirteenth Amendment
grants Congress the power to eliminate slavery. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII. To do
so, the authors had to conclude that the Thirteenth Amendment went beyond
"mere dissolution of the master/slave relationship," such that the incidents of
slavery were also sound basis for legislation. Maltz, supra note 88, at 1141.
91.
CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 475 (1866). This was done to tie
the rights of newly freed slaves under the Thirteenth Amendment, denied
citizenship under Dred Scott, to the Naturalization Clause. See Maltz, supra note
88, at 1141. The Naturalization Clause by its own text, however, only gives
Congress power to implement citizenship with respect to those entering the
country, not those bom within the United States. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4
(Congress has the power to "establish an uniform Rule of Naturalization").
92.
See Maltz, supranote 88, at 1141.
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of the United States." 9 3 This was the first enunciation by Congress

94
of a definition for citizenship.
Despite the CRA's enunciation of a statutory citizenship
definition, there was anxiety that as a mere legislative enactment,
the rights secured under it were fragile and subject to the whim of
congressional repeal. 95 Thus, the introduction, passage, and
ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment was partly a response
to concerns that the CRA was only marginally protective of the
rights it secured.
While both the CRA and Fourteenth
Amendment defined citizenship, the Fourteenth Amendment's
treatment of citizens is notable because the Amendment confers
greater constitutional protection to citizens than it does to non96
citizens.
For example, the constitutional pronouncement that states
shall not abridge privileges and immunities of the other states is
secured only for citizens, thus exempting individuals who fall
outside the constitutional definition of citizenship. 9 7 Comparatively,
states cannot deprive a person, ostensibly including non-citizens, of
life, liberty, and property without due process of law.98 Nor may
states deny any person in their territories the equal protection of the
laws. 9 9 This analysis leads to the conclusion that citizens are
guaranteed a broader class of rights than other residents. 0 0 While
courts struggle to define the scope of privileges and immunities,
there is a strong textual argument that privileges and immunities
have some impact on the incidents of citizenship as defined in the
Fourteenth Amendment.' 0 ' Thus, whether a person is a citizen is
important because the imprimatur of citizenship bestows a greater
quantum of constitutional protection under the Fourteenth

93.
Act of April 9, 1866, ch. 31, § 1 (14 Stat. 27) (emphasis added).
94.
Arguably this is not much of a definition, given its ambiguity. However,
if one keeps in mind the development of common law in the United States with
respect to territorial citizenship, the definition of citizenship in the CRA becomes
noticeably clearer.
95.
See United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 675 (1898); see also
CHESTER

JAMES

ANTIEAU,

THE

INTENDED

SIGNIFICANCE

OF

THE

FOURTEENTH

AMENDMENT 3 (1997) (noting that several authors of the Fourteenth Amendment
believed repeal of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 was an actual concern, additionally
there was a need to legislatively repudiate the Supreme Court decision in Dred

Scott).
96.
See Maltz, supranote 88, at 1143-44 (discussing the function of equal
protection and due process in the Fourteenth Amendment and their application to
citizens and non-citizens).
97.
See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
98.
See id.
99.
See Maltz, supra note 88, at 1144 (quoting Senator Howard for the
proposition that even non-citizens are afforded the right to equal protection of the
laws); see also infra notes 238-41 and accompanying text.
100.
See Maltz, supra note 88, at 1144.
101. See id.
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Amendment than is granted to non-citizens. Therefore, a detailed
analysis of the Fourteenth Amendment's Citizenship Clause is
needed to define who are citizens, and specifically, whether children
born to illegal immigrants fall under the clause's definition of
citizenship.
birthright
Amendment
contemplates
The
Fourteenth
0 2
citizenship limited by two concepts: place and jurisdiction.1
These two limits evidence infusion of the common law's territorial
principles, and the Court has acknowledged this.' 0 3 Indeed, the
Fourteenth Amendment postulates citizenship by birth premised
and
only upon the territorial birth "[with]in the United States"
"subject[ion] to" the jurisdiction of the United States.' 0 4
If
05
fulfilled, these two components "concur to create citizenship."
The place component of the Fourteenth Amendment---"in the
Only birth
United States'"-has a fairly formalistic meaning.
within one of the union's states will render one a citizen. 10 6 This
was the rule explained in Rabang v. INS, in which the U.S. Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that birth in the Philippines
during its period as a U.S. territory did not constitute birth within
"the United States."' 0 7 Relying on the previous limitation of the
Revenue Clause's' 0 8 term "the United States" in the Insular
Cases,10 9 the court similarly limited the phrase "in the United
States" in the Fourteenth Amendment's Citizenship Clause." 0

102.
See United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 676 (1898).
103.
See id. at 687 (discussing the jurisdiction requirement); see generally
Rabang v. INS, 35 F.3d 1449, 1452 (9th Cir. 1994) (discussing what "in the United
States" means).
104.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
105.
Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. at 659 (quoting Inglis v. Sailor's Snug Harbor,
28 U.S. 99 (1830) (Story, J., dissenting)).
106.
See Rabang, 35 F.3d at 1452.
107.
Id.
U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 1.
108.
109.
See DeLima v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244 (1901); Dooley v. United States,
182 U.S. 222 (1901); Armstong v. United States, 182 U.S. 243 (1901); Downes v.
Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244 (1901). The holdings of the Insular Cases were realfirmed
by the Supreme Court in United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez. 494 U.S. 259, 268-69
(1990) (noting that not "every constitutional provision applies wherever the United
States government exercises its power."). There is however, strong disagreement
about the dicta in the InsularCases with respect to its mention of citizenship. See
Drimmer, supra note 5, at 704 n.12 (citing the dissent of Justice Marshall in
Harris v. Rosario, 466 U.S. 651, 653 (1980) ("the present validity of the [Insular
Cases] is questionable") (Marshall, J., dissenting)). Despite this, the Court has not
overruled the holding of the Insular Cases and the attendant expansive power of
Congress in the area of immigration policy. See Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at
268-69.
110.
See Rabang, 35 F.3d at 1452. The Court in Downes compared the
Revenue Clause with both the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments. 182 U.S.
244, 251 (1901). The Court noted the Fourteenth Amendment has "a limitation
to persons born... in the United States which is not extended to persons born in
any place 'subject to their jurisdiction'." Id. (emphasis added).

712

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 33:693

The court in Rabang imported the analysis of the Insular Cases,
concluding that the Citizenship Clause expressly identifies a
territorial limitation that precludes extension of birthright
citizenship in every place where the United States maintains
sovereignty. 1 1 ' Thus, "the United States" does not include all the
territory under the political jurisdiction of the United States
government.112
In addition to birth within the United States, the birth must
be "subject to the jurisdiction" of the United States. 11 3 In this
regard, the case of United States v. Wong Kim Ark is illustrative of
the Fourteenth Amendment's jurisdictional component. 1 14 Born
in San Francisco to Chinese immigrant parents," s Wong Kim Ark
was refused permission to reenter the United States after a
temporary visit to China. 116 This decision was made solely on the
assertion that he was not a U.S. citizen. 117 The United States
argued Wong Kim Ark was not a citizen because "the mother and
father... being Chinese persons, and subjects of the emperor of
China" transferred their status as "Chinese subjects" to their
son. 118
The Court rejected this argument and, basing its
decision on the Fourteenth Amendment Citizenship Clause, held
Wong Kim Ark to be a citizen by virtue of his birth in the United
1 19
States.
In rejecting the government's argument that descent should
be considered, the Court reasoned from the Citizenship Clause's
"subject to the jurisdiction" component. 120 The Court focused on
common law exceptions to jurisdiction first enunciated in Calvin's
Case and noted Wong Kim Ark's parents did not fall within either
common law exception. 12 1 The Court determined that a parent's
citizenship, where the parent was lawfully admitted into the

111.
See Rabang, 35 F.3d at 1453.
112. See id. This does not mean U.S. citizenship is elusive of those residing
in U.S. territories. Congress can confer citizenship under its constitutionally
delegated naturalization power. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
113. U.S. CONST. amend XIV, § 1.
114. 169 U.S. 649 (1898).
115. See id. Wong Kim Ark's parents were still "subject to the emperor of
China," and, therefore, the government asserted that Ark's presence was unlawful.
Id. at 650.
116. See id. at 653.
117. See id.
118. Id. at 650. Additional allegations related to the denial of Wong Kim
Ark's reentry under the Chinese Exclusion Acts. See id. The Court rejected these
assertions because determination of his citizenship by birth necessarily made the
U.S. arguments under the Exclusion Acts moot. See id. at 704.
119.
See id.
120.
See id. at 663 (noting that analysis of the common law leads to the
conclusion that "subject to the jurisdiction" applies to all persons born "within the
territory" of the country).
121.
See supranote 24 and accompanying text.
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United States, was not determinative so long as the child's birth
was in the United States and subject to its jurisdiction. 12 2 Thus,
Wong Kim Ark holds that children born in the United States "of
resident aliens," with the exception of common law exclusions,
come within the Fourteenth Amendment's affirmation of the
"ancient and fundamental rule of citizenship by birth within the
123
territory."
The parent's immigration status was not a bar to the child's
citizenship status in Wong Kim Ark. 12 4
Left unanswered,
however, is the question of whether this rule applies in
circumstances in which the parents are not lawful residents of
the United States. It is on this nominally unanswered question
that opponents of birthright citizenship base their conclusion that
children of illegal immigrants are not U.S. citizens. A perfunctory
reading of Wong Kim Ark, however, indicates a parent's status is
immaterial: the Court only lists the common law exceptions, "as
old as the rule itself," as basis for denying citizenship to children
born in the United States territory.12 5 Under modern analysis,
where substantial importance is placed on the legal status of the
immigrant, it is unclear whether the formulation in Wong Kim Ark
is applicable to children born of illegal immigrants. What is clear,
however, is that the common law is the basis of territorial
birthright citizenship in the United States under the Fourteenth
Amendment.126
C. The Role of the Common Law in the English
and American Systems
The common law basis of territorial birthright citizenship is
necessary to understand the contemporary issues associated with

122.

Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. at 694. The court noted:

To hold that the Fourteenth Amendment... excludes from citizenship the
children born in the United States, of citizens or subjects of other
countries, would be to deny citizenship to thousands of persons of English,
Scotch, Irish, German or other European parentage, who have always been
considered and treated as citizens of the United States.
Id.
This passage, while elucidating the point that constitutional birthright
citizenship is not determined by one's parents citizenship status, also points to a
subtle racism indicating a "we could be next" concern.
123.
Id. at 692.
124.
See id. at 694.
125.
Id. at 692; supra note 24 and accompanying text for discussion of
common law exceptions to birth within the sovereign's jurisdiction.
126.
Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. at 654 (where the Court noted "[t]he
constitution nowhere defines the meaning of these words [the Fourteenth
Amendment's Citizenship Clause] ...
it must be interpreted in the light of the
common law.
").
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conferring citizenship on children born of illegal immigrants. The
common law, however, functions in significantly different ways in
the United Kingdom and the United States.
The United Kingdom's abandonment of pure territorial
birthright citizenship and establishment of a parentage based
citizenship requirement for British citizenship is itself a part of
the dynamism characterizing U.K. common law. 12 7 Without a
written constitution, the U.K. confluence of history, legislation,
and court decisions form a true "living constitution" in the sense
that the constitution itself evolves with each piece of legislation
passing out of Parliament. Contrary to the design of America's
constitutional republic, U.K. courts do not have authority to
strike down legislation. 12 8 Thus, "Parliamentary Supremacy"
denotes the power of the legislature in the United Kingdom to
procure
laws
that
fundamentally
alter
the
national
constitution, 12 9 an example of which is the BNA.
Under the rubric of a written constitution, the common law
functions differently in the United States. The U.S. Supreme
Court is the sole interpreter of the U.S. Constitution,13 0 and the
written Constitution places restrictions on the substance of
legislation procured by Congress. 1 3 1 Because the terms in the
Fourteenth Amendment's Citizenship Clause are not explicitly
clear,' 3 2 the Court has turned to common law principles and
history. 1 33 Thus, in American jurisprudence, the common law
serves the function of explaining written text in the Constitution.
Once again the question is asked-are children born in the
United States of illegal immigrants citizens? Part of this modern
dilemma focuses on the contemporary utility of the common law
concept of territorial birthright and whether it is still cardinal to
the Ango-American model of birthright citizenship. The answer
to this question and the modern utility of common law concepts

127.
128.

See BNA, ch. 61; see also supraPart II.A.2.
See Wilson, supra note 33, at 590; see also 4 W.S. HOLDSWORTH, A

HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 186 (1937).

129.
See HOLDSWORTH, supranote 128, at 186.
130.
See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1804) (establishing the
concept of judicial review of acts of Congress to determine whether they comport
to the constitution); see also Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 29 (1958) (formalizing the
Supreme Court as the ultimate arbiter of constitutional questions).
131.
See U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2 ("[t]his Constitution, and the Laws of the
United States which shall be made in Pursuancethereof... shall be the supreme
Law of the Land") (emphasis added); see also United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S.
549, 552 (1995) (holding that Congress exceeded its Constitutional grant of
authority under the Commerce Clause when it passed the Gun-Free School Zones
Act of 1990, and noting that the "Constitution creates a Federal Government of
enumerated powers").
132.
See United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 654 (1898).
133.
See id.
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have led states, politicians, and Congress to offer solutions
spanning from cutting off aid to illegal immigrants and their
13 4
children to legislative efforts to define the Citizenship Clause.
The answer to this question, however, is a constitutional one.
And as a constitutional question, the answer lies with the
35
Supreme Court.'

III.

THE MODERN DILEMMA: THE STATUS OF CHILDREN

BORN OF ILLEGAL IMMIGRANTS WITHIN A COUNTRY'S
TERRITORIAL JURISDICTION

While the citizenship status of children born of illegal
immigrants in the United Kingdom is settled,1 3 6 their status is by
no means clearly defined in the United States. 13 7 This is because
the specific issue has never been answered by the Supreme
Court. Furthermore, the Court's omission has politicized the
issue such that contemporary debate now focuses on political
solutions to what is essentially a constitutional dilemma. The
constitutional dilemma of whether children of illegal immigrants
fall within the Fourteenth Amendment's definition of "citizen"
does not mean, however, that political solutions to stem the flow
of illegal immigration and the ancillary effects on children of
illegal immigrants are per se unlawful, though they very well may
be misguided as matters of public policy.

134.
A discussion of alternatives and moves to restrict citizenship will be
discussed infra Part III.B.3. Court-recognized congressional naturalization and
immigration power is subject to limited review by the judiciary because exercise of
this power is essentially a political question and implicates foreign policy powers.
See Miller v. Albright, 523 U.S. 420, 434-35 (1998) (affirming that the Court has
been traditionally deferential to the legislature and executive in the area of
immigration policy); Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 792 (1977) (finding a "long
recognized power to expel or exclude aliens as a fundamental sovereign attribute
exercised by the Government's political departments largely immune from judicial
control."). Thus, a better solution to the problem may be a more vigorous
enforcement of Congress' expansive power under the Naturalization clause and
immigration authority. This solution will be discussed in detail infra notes 207-36
and accompanying text.
135.
Congress has no authority to define a provision of the constitution.
See Marbury, 5 U.S. at 177 (noting that it is "the province and duty of the judicial
department to say what the law is").
136.
See BNA, ch. 61.
137.
See Drimmer, supranote 5, at 671 (noting the legal status of Americanborn children of illegal immigrants is "uncertain").
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A. U.K. Law Does Not Recognize Childrenof illegal
Immigrants as Citizens
Legislation is part-and-parcel of the United Kingdom's
common law. The theory of Parliamentary Supremacy dictates
that the legislature is the primary institution to alter the U.K.
constitution.1 3 8 Thus, under the BNA, the settled rule is that
13 9
children born of illegal immigrants are not British citizens.
The one major exception to this general rule is carved out for
140
newborn infants "found abandoned in the United Kingdom."
In such circumstances, the presumption is that the child is a
British citizen. 14 1 The inclusion of abandoned children is a
prudent one and corresponds to international goals to eradicate
"statelessness," 142 whereby an individual is denied "the essential
143
benefits of nationality to a State."
By altering common law territorial birthright citizenship, the
United Kingdom made a policy decision defining British
citizenship based on the child's bond to the United Kingdom as
evidenced by the citizenship status of their parent. 144
The
alteration of 375 years of common law signified a departure from
the importance of the territorial component, as expounded by
Coke in Calvin's Case, and an acceptance of the mutual bond
theory that is the basis of Lockean consent theory. 14S The birth

138.
See HOLDSWORTH, supranote 128, at 186-87.
139.
SeeBNA, ch. 61, § 1(1).
140.
Id. at § 1(2).
141.
See id.(the abandoned child is "deemed... to have been born in the
United Kingdom ... and to have been born to a parent who at the time of birth
was a British citizen or settled in the United Kingdom").
142.
HERSCH LAUTERPACHT, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND HUMAN RIGHTS 315 (1950)
(discussing the International Bill of the Rights of Man, which states that "[e]very
person shall be entitled to the nationality of the State where he is born unless and
until on attaining majority he declares for the nationality open to him by virtue of
descent"); see also Michael Gunlicks, Citizenship as a Weapon in Controllingthe
Flow of Undocumented Aliens: Evaluation of Proposed Denials of Citizenship to
Children of Undocumented Aliens Born in the United States, 63 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
551, 579-80 (1995) (analyzing the concept under U.S. law and noting that in
international law there is a customary presumption against statelessness,
reinforced in a number of treaties, to which the United States is not a party).
143.
But see Satvinder S. Juss, Nationality Law, Sovereignty, and the
Doctrines of Exclusive Domestic Jurisdictions, 9 FLA. J. INT'L L. 219, 228 (1994).
Juss argues, however, the British Act as a whole is contrary to this principle
because it has the effect of encouraging statelessness. See id. Thus, the British
Act is contrary to the manifestation of subject status enunciated in Calvin's Case
where Lord Coke asserted that a parent's status was irrelevant to the status of the
child. See supra notes 27-28 and accompanying text.
144.
See Wilson, supranote 33, at 586-88.
145.
See JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT (Peter Laslett ed.,
1988). Lockean consent theory is premised on the assertion that individuals are
not naturally subject to a sovereign. See Drimmer, supra note 5, at 674. Rather,
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of a child within the territorial limits of the United Kingdom is not
the sole factor to determine British citizenship because consent of
the sovereign (or ligeance) is not established, that is, a child's
parentage under the British Act is not established. Therefore,
consent of the sovereign is absent, as evidenced in the express
language in the BNA, which posits consent of the sovereign in
terms of whether one of the children's parents is a British citizen.
B. U.S. Law Recognizes the Citizensfdp of Children
Born of Illegal Immigrants
Based on the plain text of the Fourteenth Amendment, the
status of children born to illegal immigrants appears settled in
favor of conferring citizenship on these children, particularly if
common law precepts are acknowledged as the basis for the
Amendment's phrasing. Some uncertainty remains, however,
because the Supreme Court has never clarified the status of these
children born to illegal immigrants. 14 6 Contemporary debate,
therefore, focuses on whether the parent's status determines the
child's citizenship status.
1. Caselaw, While Not Conclusive, Leans Toward Recognizing
Citizenship in Children Born to Illegal Immigrants
Opponents contend that conferring citizenship on children
born to illegal immigrants is unconstitutional because their
parents' illegal status renders these children outside the
constitutional mandate requiring birthright citizens to be "subject
to the [United Statesl jurisdiction." 147 Therefore, such children

individuals consent to be governed and subordinate their natural freedom for
protection by organized government. See LOCKE, supra, at § 129. Locke solved
the problem of birth into an organized society by presenting the theory of "tacit
consent," whereby consent was implied so long as the individual remained under
the government's protection. See id. at § 118. Nevertheless, Locke did not believe
that children could consent to the government under which they were born. See
id. Consent did not manifest until adulthood, where a volitional choice could be
made. See id.
See Drimmer, supranote 5, at 671; see also Stein & Bauer, supra note
146.
5, at 128 (noting neither the Court nor the Constitution have answered the
question of whether children of illegal immigrants are citizens).
See generally SCHUCK & SMITH, supra note 10. Schuck's basic premise
147.
is that the common law theory of jus soli first enunciated in Calvin's Case and
implanted in the Fourteenth Amendment's Citizenship Clause, has been
mischaracterized. Schuck asserts that in addition to a territorial component,
there is a strong elucidation of a consensual principle of citizenship in the
common law derivation of jus soli See id. at 13-15. The principle of consent
requires both the allegiance of the sovereign to the subject and the allegiance of
the subject to the sovereign. See id. at 15-16 (quoting Calvin's Case, 77 Eng. Rep.
377, 390 (K.B. 1604) ("When born he owes birthright allegiance and obedience to
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are not citizens by birth because the requisite consent of the
United States is absent. 148 Opponents' arguments have some
force because the Court in Wong Kim Ark 14 9 did not identify how
jurisdiction manifests itself with respect to non-resident alien
parents. The Court apparently accepted the argument made
originally in Calvin's Case-jurisdiction is exclusive and mutual
between the government and the "subject." 5 0 The application of
this principle in contemporary American jurisprudence, where the
child's parents are in the country unlawfully, was never posed to
the Court in Wong Kim Ark.
If this important component of whether the parent is lawfully
admitted into the United States is missing in Wong Kim Ark's
analysis, as it appears to be, it begs the question: Is a parent's
alien status, legal or illegal, a factor as to whether citizenship can
5
inhere in a child born in the United States of such parents?' '
A preliminary and arguably convincing answer to this
conundrum is that a parent's status does not proscribe a child,
born under sanction of the two components of the Citizenship

Clause, from obtaining birthright citizenship. l5 2 However, dicta
in Wong Kim Ark suggests a requisite affirmative "permission" by
the U.S. government in

order to afford aliens protection and

his sovereign")). But see Calvin's Case, 77 Eng. Rep. at 399 (positing that "any
place within the King's dominions may make a subject born, but any place within
the King's dominion without obedience can never produce a natural subject"
[obedience refers to common law exceptions to "birth within the jurisdiction!children of foreign diplomats and children of foreign enemies born during a time of
hostility]). Schuck places too much emphasis on the concept of consent. For
instance, while the court in Calvin's Case did acknowledge a consent factor, it was
premised on the principle of obedience, which was found to be manifest once a
person entered the realm of the Crown and became subject to its laws. Id. at 384
(finding temporary obedience of the parent is sufficient to make a natural born
subject of a child).
148. See discussion supra note 145. Lockean consent theory underpins
Schuck's argument rejecting citizenship in children of illegal immigrants. See
SCHUCK & SMITH, supra note 10, at 73, 76 (noting that the Founders were
adherents to Lockean consent theory and individual rights, not feudal notions of
property and citizenship).
149.
169 U.S. 649 (1898).
150. See id. at 694; see also supra notes 10, 23 and accompanying text.
151. Shuck argues the parents provisionally stand in the shoes of their
children, such that their illegal presence is transferred to the child. See SCHUCK &
SMITH, supra note 10, at 94-96. This theory is legally unsound in light of Plyler v.
Doe. 457 U.S. 202 (1981) (arguing that undocumented children are not culpable
for their parents bringing them into the United States). Additionally, Schuck's
theory is in contravention to the "corruption of blood" principle, discussed infra at
note 158.
152. See Gunlicks, supranote 142, at 572 (noting "little or no reason exists,
however, to doubt the allegiance of the children when such an inquiry appears
based solely on the questioned allegiance of the children's parents").
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allegiance to the United States.1 5 3 This theme finds support in
an earlier case, Elk v. Wilkins.' S4 There the Court found that the
phrase "subject to the jurisdiction" did not mean mere subjection
"in some respect or degree to the jurisdiction of the United States,
but completely subject to their political jurisdiction, and owing
them direct and immediate allegiance." l s s Those seeking to deny
birthright citizenship to children born to illegal immigrants couch
their position in the conjunctive nature of the Citizenship Clause,
which requires both birth in the United States and subjection to
its jurisdiction. While the child may be born in the United States,
the child, under the opponents' theory, is not subject to the
or
jurisdiction because his parent is not under the 5ligeance,
6
government.'
U.S.
the
of
parlance,
modem
in
consent
Despite this intellectual ammunition, those seeking to deny
citizenship to children born in the United States of illegal
immigrants are countered by several arguments. First, children
born in the United States of illegal immigrants are morally
blameless for the illegal actions of their parents and therefore
This
should not be punished for their parents' actions.' 5 7

169 U.S. at 694. The Court suggested that non-citizens are entitled to
153.
protection from and owe corresponding allegiance to the United States "so long as

they are permitted by the United States to reside there." Id.
154. 112 U.S. 94, 102 (1844).
155. Id. (emphasis added). The question presented in Elk v. Wilkins was
whether "an Indian, born a member of one of the Indian tribes within the United
States, is, merely by reason of his birth within the United States ... a citizen of
the United States .

. . ."

Id. at 99.

This suggests something more than mere

territorial jurisdiction is necessary to confer citizenship. See Gunlicks, supra note
l/kins is the only post-Fourteenth Amendment case denying
142, at 568-70.
citizenship because of a deficiency of allegiance. See id. at 569-70. The opinion,
however, itself acknowledges the unique nature of Native Americans in the United
States. See Wilkins, 112 U.S. at 102; see also United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169
U.S. 649, 682 (1898) (distinguishing Wilkins in that it "only concerned members of
the Indian tribes... and had no tendency to deny citizenship to children born in
The Fourteenth Amendment also
the United States of foreign parents").
recognizes this unique nature and mandates that Native Americans are not
counted for the purpose of congressional apportionment. See U.S. CONST. amend.
XIV, § 2 ("Representatives shall be apportioned among the several states according
to their respective numbers, counting the whole number of persons in each state,
excluding Indians not taxed"); see also Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. at 680.
156. This is conceptually specious because the Citizenship Clause, while
having two conjunctive requirements, holistically is premised on territorial
requirements. The nature of the common law basis of birth within the "legiance"
of the sovereign is essentially territorial, with the longstanding exceptions for
those born of foreign diplomats and those born to hostile foreign occupying forces.
See supra notes 10, 24 and accompanying text.
157. This theory has been termed the "corruption of blood" principle. See
Robert J. Schulman, Children of a Lesser God: Should the FourteenthAmendment
Be Altered or Repealed to Deny Automatic Citizenship Rights and Privileges to
American Born Children of Illegal AliensP, 22 PEPP. L. REv. 669, 704-09 (1995).
The corruption of blood principle has its origins in Anglo-Saxon jurisprudence.
See id. (citing Max Stier, Note, Corruptionof Blood and Equal Protection- Why the
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articulation, known as the corruption of blood principle, has been
made time and again by the Supreme Court. 15 8 In the context of
illegal immigration, the Court, in Plyler v. Doe, accepted this
principle as
a component of its rationale,
holding
unconstitutional a Texas law prohibiting the use of state
education funds for children who were not lawfully admitted into
the United States.' s 9 Because "children can have little control," if
any, over their parent's illegal entrance into the United States, it
is "difficult to conceive of a rational justification for penalizing
these children for their presence within the United States." 160 In
Plyler, the corruption of blood principle was applied to children
born outside the United States and unlawfully present in the
United States.
Corruption of blood has even more forceful
meaning, however, when applied to children born within the
United States to illegal immigrant parents. Even if one accepts
the consent theory of jurisdiction, 16 1 it would be contrary to the

Sins of the Parents Should Not Matter, 44 STAN. L. REV. 727, 729-30 (1992)). The
concept finds explicit recognition in the following clause of the U.S. Constitution:
"The Congress shall have the Power to declare the Punishment of Treason, but not
Attainder of Treason shall work Corruption of Blood... except during the Life of
the person Attained." U.S. CONST. art. III, § 3, cl. 2; see also Korematsu v. United
States, 323 U.S. 214, 242 (1944) (noting "if any fundamental assumption
underlies our system, it is that guilt is personal and not inheritable. Even if all of
one's antecedents had been convicted of treason, the Constitution forbids its
penalties to be visited upon him.... .") (Jackson, J. dissenting).
158.
See Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 770 (1977) ("[P]arents have the
ability to conform their conduct to societal norms" but children can "affect neither
their parents' conduct nor their own status"); Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety
Co., 406 U.S. 164, 175 (1972) ("[Visiting] ... condemnation on the head of an
infant is illogical and unjust ... Obviously, no child is responsible for his birth
and penalizing the ... child is an ineffectual-as well as unjust-way of deterring
the parent"). Additionally, Lord Coke's opinion in Calvin's Case lends credibility to
the corruption of blood principle as it applies to territorial birthright citizenship.
Coke found the parent's status irrelevant to securing a child's status as a natural
born subject, limited by common law exceptions, of course. See Calvin's Case, 77
Eng. Rep. 377, 384 (K.B. 1608). While Calvin's Case rested on territorial
principles, and not corruption of blood, the concepts certainly compliment each
other where the child is brought into a country through no fault of his own.
159. 457 U.S. 202, 219-220 (1981). The Court's primary rational was based
in the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause. See id. at 230. The Court
analyzed the illegal immigrant children's claim under an intermediate level of
scrutiny, finding the state's interest in stopping illegal immigration was not
substantial and additionally was preempted by plenary federal power over
immigration policy. See id.
160. Id. at 220.
161. There is no binding authority requiring a court to accept the consent
theory as a method to restrict a child born of illegal immigrant parents from
becoming a citizen at the time of birth. At most, the consent theory offered by
opponents of territorial birthright citizenship is a basis to reinterpret the
Citizenship Clause.
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corruption of blood principle 16 2 for absence of U.S. consent in the
parent's presence to transfer to the child.
Second, the Supreme Court has not found consent, at least
in the formal sense of permission, dispositive with respect to
whether one is subject to the jurisdiction under the Citizenship
Clause. The consent inference, drawn from sparse wording in
Wong Kim Ark,16 3 and advocated by opponents of conferring
birthright citizenship to children born to illegal immigrants,
misconstrues the Court's long-held position of imputing common
law elements into citizenship law. 16 4 Thus, consent theorists lose
sight of the forest but for the trees by failing to account for the
distinct primacy of the territorial component inherent in the
"subject to the jurisdiction" phrase's meaning. 165 Furthermore,
the U.S. rule of territorial birthright citizenship is fortified by
Calvin's Case, which expounded the territorial nature of ligeance
and manifests consent broadly, 16 6 limited only by the common
law exceptions for children born of diplomats and children born of
hostile occupying forces. 16 7 Despite the status of the immigrant

162.
Unlike the consent theory, the corruption of blood principle has been
accepted, time and again, by the Supreme Court. See supra notes 157-59 and
accompanying text. If the circumstances warrant, it is possible the corruption of

blood principle could be invoked to reject Congressional attempts to strip
citizenship in children born of illegal immigrants solely based on their parents'
wrongdoing.
163. United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 692 (1898).
164. See id. at 655. (quoting Smith v. Alabama, 124 U.S. 465, 478 (1888)
("There is no common law of the United States, in the sense of a national
customary law, distinct from the common law of England")); see Price, supra note
7, at 73.
165. See id. at 657 (quoting Lord Chief Justice Cockburn that "[bly common
law of England, every person born within the dominions of the crown, no matter
whether of English or foreign parents, and, in the later case, whether... settled,
or merely temporarily sojouring... was an English subject" with the exception of
children born of foreign ambassadors or children born of occupying hostile forces);
see also id. at 682 (noting the real object of the Fourteenth Amendment's
Citizenship Clause was to "exclude, by the fewest and fittest words . .. the two
classes of cases . .. shown, by the laws of England, and by our own law" as
recognized exceptions).
166. The jurisdiction of the United States within its own territory is
absolute. See Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651, 659 (1892) (noting
"fi]t is an accepted maxim of international law that every sovereign nation has the
power... to forbid the entrance of foreigners within its dominions"); The Schooner
Exchange v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 136 (1812). Ligeance subsists at
birth for "as soon as he is born he oweth by birth-right ligeance and obedience to
his Sovereign." Calvin's Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 377, 382 (K.B. 1608). This mutual
nature of the ligeance-from where critics such as Schuck glean an essence of
consent, in addition to Lockean theory-is quite ascriptive: ligeance "is the
mutual bond and obligationbetween the King and his subjects.., they are bound
to obey and serve him; and . . . he should maintain and defend them."

(emphasis added).
167. See id. at 384.

Ic.
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parents, jurisdiction over the child is not absent so long as he is
present within the territorial defmition of the United States. 168
2. Constitutional Ambiguities Perpetuate Confusion as to
Whether Children Born in the United States of Illegal Immigrants
Are Citizens
Caselaw does not require formal consent by the United States
to the parent's presence in order for children of illegal immigrants
to be recognized as citizens. Neither, however, does the caselaw
definitively state the converse proposition-that these children
are, in fact, citizens.
Common law precepts, though, militate
toward this conclusion. An essential part of understanding the
contemporary controversy is recognition that the Constitution
does not definitively answer the question, it remains ambiguous.
Proper analysis, though, leads to the conclusion that while the
Court has been silent on the precise issue of children born to
illegal immigrants, the principles enunciated profess solid
application to the circumstances of these children.
Deriving the Framers' intent as to whether children, born in
the United States to illegal immigrants, are included under the
Citizenship Clause fails to elucidate the constitutional ambiguity.
Opponents of conferring citizenship onto children born to illegal
immigrants point to the Fourteenth Amendment's original
purpose-repudiating Dred Scott and conferring citizenship to
newly enfranchised blacks-as evidence for rejecting the
constitutionality of granting citizenship to children of illegal
immigrants. 169 Additionally, opponents argue that the Framers
of the Fourteenth Amendment never anticipated the flow of illegal

168. Nor is jurisdiction absent over illegal immigrant parents, who are
subject to the laws of the United States and the state where they are present. See
Plyler, 457 U.S. at 215 (noting "a person's initial entry into... the United States,
[even if] unlawful ... cannot negate the simple fact of his presence within the
State's territorial perimeter. Given such presence, he is subject to the full range of
obligations imposed by the State's civil and criminal laws"); see also Wong Kim
Ark, 169 U.S. at 685-86 (citing The Schooner Exchange, 11 U.S. at 144 (noting
"When private individuals of one nation spread themselves through another as
business or caprice may direct... it would be... dangerous to society... if such
individuals or merchants . . . were not amenable to the jurisdiction of the
country")).
169.
See Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. at 675; see also ANTIEAU, supra note 95, at
3. Opponents' argument proceeds as follows: the original purpose of the
Citizenship Clause was to bestow citizenship on recently freed black slaves, an
ostensibly narrow mission. Therefore, to expand the Citizenship Clause's meaning
to include children born to illegal immigrants stretches the clause's meaning far
beyond its original purpose.
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immigrants, nor did they anticipate the problem of citizenship by
children born to illegal immigrants in the United States. 170
Proponents of conferring citizenship, on the other hand, point
out that the Framers' failure to foresee such a set of
circumstances should not be used to justify a "restrictive
interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment." 17 1 Furthermore,
the Framers chose not to confine the Citizenship Clause by
adding more restrictive language. 17 2 Proponents' arguments are
especially poignant in light of the Citizenship Clause's common
law derivation, which was known by the Framers. 173 Because the
Framers were aware of the territorial common law underpinnings
of the Citizenship Clause, it seems dubious to infer lack of
foresight for something existing in the common law for hundreds
of years.
Thus, the disagreement over whether the phrase "subject to
the jurisdiction" is territorial or consensual is predicated on the
Citizenship Clause's textual ambiguity. This ambiguity has led to
legislative efforts seeking to define the scope of the Citizenship
Clause by narrowing it to exclude children born in the United
States to illegal immigrants. 174 This endeavor must fail, however,
because Congress has no power to define what a clause in the
Constitution means; 175 that power is left to the Supreme Court
alone. 176

170.
See SCHUCK & SMITH, supra note 10, at 95, 100 (noting that for a large
part of American history, unrestricted immigration was encouraged by the
government because of the desire to populate a vast and expanding country); see
also Gunlicks, supra note 142, at 570-71 (noting opponents argument that the
framers never anticipated illegal immigrants giving birth to children in the United
States).
171.
Gunlicks, supranote 142, at 571.
172.
See id.
173.
See Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. at 675-77.
174.
See infra Part IV.
175.
Congress may legitimately enforce the substantive rights conferred in
the Fourteenth Amendment, but it may not alter the substantive nature of the
protected rights by redefining what those rights mean. See Kimel v. Florida Bd. of
Regents, 120 S. Ct. 631, 644 (2000) (holding that the Fourteenth Amendment's § 5
.enforcement" power does not include the power to decree the substance of rights
secured under the 14th Amendment); City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507
(1997) (holding the Religious Freedom and Restoration Act unconstitutional as
applied to the states because it transcended Congress' legitimate power to enforce
provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment and unconstitutionally ventured into the
arena of dictating the substance of the rights secured thereunder).
176.
See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 144 (1803). Unlike the
Naturalization Clause, supranote 91, where deference is given to Congress over how it
implements its delegated immigration power, see Miller v. Albright, 523 U.S. 420, 43435 n. 11(1998) (quoting Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 82 (1976) (there is "a narrow
standard of review of decisions made by the Congress or the President in the area of
immigration and naturalization")), Congress does not have the same leeway with
regard to the Citizenship Clause and its enforcement power under the Fourteenth
Amendment. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5 (stating "Congress shall have the power to
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3. Distinguishing Constitutional from Political Dialogues:
Methods to Restrict Territorial Birthright Citizenship
Ultimately, the discussion of whether citizenship subsists in
children born to illegal immigrants deserts a constitutional
paradigm and enters the arena of political dialogue. 17 7 This is
evidenced by political maneuvers to alter what is essentially a
constitutional issue.1 7 8
While the constitutional
issue,
ambiguous as it may be, appears settled in favor of recognizing
citizenship in children born in the United States to illegal
immigrants, the political issues remain unsettled. 7 9 Contrary to
some commentators' allegations, efforts to except children born of
illegal immigrants from territorial birthright citizenship are not
necessarily racist.' 8 0
These efforts are premised on the
conviction that illegal immigrants are a net cost to the United
States-a product of dissatisfaction with receipt of social welfare
benefits by illegal immigrants and failure of adequate border
control-rather than on the status of innocent children born in
the United States by no fault of their own. 18 1 Characterized this

enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article"). Congress' authority
to alter the Citizenship Clause is unconstitutional because all attempts to alter the
Citizenship Clause have taken the form of legislative efforts to define the phrase
"subject to the jurisdiction." And Congress cannot define the Constitution. See
Marbury, 5 U.S. at 177. Nor can Congress use its enforcement power under the
Fourteenth Amendment to effect a substantive change to the rights protected in the
amendment. See Kine, 120 S. CL at 644 (recognizing that while the enforcement
power is a grant of positive lawmaking power to Congress, it "also serves to limit that
power"); City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 519 (holding that "Congress cannot decree the
substance of the Fourteenth Amendment's restrictions on the States ....
The
ultimate interpretation and determination of the Fourteenth Amendment's substantive
meaning remains the province of the Judicial Branch.")
177. See Stein & Bauer, supra note 5, at 130 (noting that practical,
financial, and political reasons militate toward rejecting territorial birthright
citizenship). Dan Stein was Executive Director of the Federation for American
Immigration Reform (FAIR), an organization dedicated to lobbying for the
restriction of both legal and illegal immigration into the United States.
178. Legislative attempts to prohibit citizenship in children born to illegal
immigrants are discussed infra notes 190-200 and accompanying text.
179. Highlighting the current political significance of the citizenship status
of children to illegal immigrants, several bills have been introduced in the 106th
Congress to eliminate the territorial basis of birthright citizenship. These bills are
discussed in detail infra at notes 191-94.
180. See Drimmer, supra note 5, at 708 (stating "the community today still
is unwilling to recognize racially and culturally distinct groups as members of the
national polity"); see also Wilson, supra note 33, at 581 (asserting that those
seeking to eradicate illegal immigration harbor racially exclusive motivations). The
troublesome aspect of these assertions is that they are devoid of logical analysis
with respect to the policy arguments made by opponents of territorial birthright
citizenship. Such accusations-whether true or not-denigrate the entire level of
debate to ad hominem attacks.
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way, the political issues of immigration policy, which are clearly
entrusted to Congress, conflate with constitutionally-defined
citizenship in children who are innocent of their parents'
wrongdoing.

As of 1999, the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS)
estimates five million illegal immigrants reside in the United
States.1 8 2
However, due to the elusive nature of illegal
immigrants, the estimates range between three and eight
million.1 8 3 This number represents roughly two percent of the
U.S. population.1 8 4 According to the INS, the current population
of illegal immigrants is estimated to grow by 275,000 each
year.185 With specific reference to children born in the United
States to illegal immigrants, the California Health and Welfare
Agency reported that forty percent of births in California countyrun hospitals, or 217,000 children
between 1989 and 1993, were
18 6
born to illegal immigrants.
The Supreme Court's silence with respect to whether these
children are U.S. citizens fails to curb political efforts to restrict

181.
Cost does not merely reflect monetary disbursements. There are
enforcement costs as well.
182.
Dena Bunis & Guillermo X. Garcia, INS to Hire 1,600 New Workers: The
Beefed-Up Staff is to Cut the PaperworkLogjam and Supplement the Border Patrol,
ORANGE COUNTY REG., Feb. 18, 1999. The INS reports that 2.1 million illegal
immigrants were classified as "overstays," meaning they were lawfully admitted
but remained after their visas expired. IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE,
U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, Statistics (last modified Aug. 11, 1999) <http://
www.ins.doj.gov/graphics/aboutins/statistics/iegalalien/ index.htm>.
183. See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 218 n.17 (1981) (quoting an estimate
by the U.S. Attorney General that 3 to 6 million illegal immigrants reside in the
United States); see also Drimmer, supra note 5, at 708 (noting research indicates
3 to 8 million illegal immigrants living in the United States). Because illegal
immigrants are ostensibly present in the United States without the government's
knowledge, it is difficult to get an accurate count of their exact numbers. Between
1991 and 1994, however, the concrete number of at least 4,878,502 illegal
immigrants can be calculated as having entered the United States. See VERNON M.
BRIGGS, MASS IMMIGRATION AND THE NATIONAL INTEREST 157 (1996) (citing the
number of illegal immigrants actually apprehended by the INS). The use of
apprehension data, however, must be viewed with the understanding that this
number, while concrete, includes those illegal immigrants who have entered and
been apprehended multiple times. See id. at 155. Nor, of course, does it actually
indicate those who entered the country without apprehension. See id.
184.

See IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE, supra note 182 (noting

1.9% of the U.S. population consists of illegal immigrants); see also ROBERT SURO,
WATCHING AMERICA'S DOOR, THE IMMIGRATION BACKLASH AND THE NEW POLICY DEBATE
49 (1996).
185.
See IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE, supranote 182. The INS
reports that this growth estimate is 25,000 lower than was estimated in 1994.

See id.
186. See Drimmer, supra note 5, at 709 (citing Richard Sybert, Population,
Immigration and Growth in California, 31 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 945, 974 (1994)
(alleging 62% of all births in Los Angeles County hospitals in 1991 were to illegal
immigrants)).
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territorial birthright citizenship, especially when data is presented
showing a high number of births to illegal immigrants, arguably
at taxpayer expense. 18 7 Because territorial birthright citizenship
is a constitutional issue, taxpayer expense is immaterial to
whether these children are citizens.' 8 8 Thus, critics of conferring
territorial birthright citizenship are generally criticizing U.S.
policy decisions directed at immigration and social services, not
89
the children themselves.1
Responding to appeals to restrict the birthright citizenship
clause, Congress has sought, heretofore unsuccessfully, to alter
the Fourteenth Amendment. 190 The 106th Congress has two bills
that, by different means, seek to deny citizenship to children born
in the United States to illegal immigrants. 19 1 The Citizenship
Reform Act of 1999 is an attempt to amend the Immigration and
Nationality Act 19 2 by redefiming "subject to the jurisdiction" under
the act to deny citizenship at birth "to children born in the United
States of parents who are not citizens of the United States or

187. See id. n.290. The net cost or benefit of illegal immigrants is beyond
the scope of this Note. Suffice it to note that these studies purporting to show net
costs or benefits are inconclusive. See Immigrants Welfare, RES. PERS. ON
MIGRATION (Int'l Migration Pol. Program: Carnegie Endowment for Intl Peace/Urb.
Inst.) Sept./Oct. 1996 at 3 (noting that immigrant use of welfare has been rising
despite how "immigrant" or "welfare" is defined but noting also that there is no
.reputable evidence that prospective immigrants are drawn to the United States
because of its public assistance programs"); see also JULIAN L. SIMON, IMMIGRATION:
THE DEMOGRAPHIC AND ECONOMIC FACTS 42 (Cato Institute & National Immigration

Forum 1996) (noting that per capita, illegal immigrants receive only 38% of the
social welfare expenditures that natives receive and pay 46% of the taxes natives
pay).
188. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, at § 1, cl. 1.
189. See Stein & Bauer, supra note 5, at 130 (arguing that rejection of the
territorial birthright basis of the Citizenship Clause is necessary to stymie the
"population explosion" and to protect the United States "limited resources" that
are "already tremendously strained"); see also SCHUCK & SMITH, supra note 10, at
91.
190. See generally Stein & Bauer, supra note 5, at 130 (arguing that
because the interpretation of "subject to the jurisdiction" is "open to debate"
Congress should test the constitutionality of territorial birthright citizenship by
legislating a definition that excepts children born of illegal immigrants). This
argument is premised on the erroneous assumption that Congress may define
provisions of the Constitution. It may not. See Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents,
120 S. Ct. 631, 644 (2000); City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 517-19 (1997);
see also Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 187 (1803) (holding that the
Supreme Court is the ultimate interpreter of the Constitution).
191. See H.R. 73, 106th Cong. (1999) (authored by Congressman Brian
Bilbray); H.R. 319, 106th Cong. (1999) ("A bill to clarify the effect on citizenship of
an individual of the individual's birth in the United States") (authored by
Congressman Stump)). In the 105th Congress, H.R. 73 was submitted as the
Citizenship Reform Act of 1995 with identical wording, but failed to move out of
committee. H.R. 1363, 105th Cong. (1995).
192. 8 U.S.C. § 1401 (1994). The Act reads in relevant part: "The following
shall be nationals and citizens of the United States at birth: (a) a person born in
the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof. .. ."
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permanent resident aliens." 193 Additionally, H.R. 319 has been
submitted to "clarify the effect on the citizenship of an individual
of the individual's birth in the United States," whereby Congress
asserts its enforcement power under § 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment to define "subject to the jurisdiction" under § I of the
94
Amendment.1
These bills are essentially constitutional amendments under
the guise of legislation. Instead of amending the Citizenship
Clause through the traditional vote of a super-majority of both
houses proposing and three-quarters of the states ratifying a
constitutional amendment,' 9 5 H.R.s 73 and 319 seek to do so by
a simple majority vote of both houses of Congress and a
presidential signature. The effect would be de facto amendment
of the Citizenship Clause by the legislature, in clear violation of
separation of powers 19 6 and City of Boeme v. Flores,1 97 which
recognized limits to Congress' enforcement power' 9 8 under § 5 of
193.
194.

H.R. 73, §§ 2, 3 (amending 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101, 1401).
H.R. 319 reprinted in full states:

In the exercise of its powers under section 5 of the Fourteenth Article of
Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, the Congress has
determined and hereby declares that any person born after the date of
enactment of this Act to a mother who is neither a citizen or national of the
United States nor admitted to the United States as a lawful permanent
resident, and which person is a citizen or national of another country of
which either of his or her natural parents is a citizen or national, or is
entitled upon application to become a citizen or national of such country,
shall be considered as born subject to the jurisdiction of that foreign
country and not subject to the jurisdiction of the United States within the
meaning of section I of such Article and shall therefore not be a citizen of
the United States or of any State solely by reason of birth in the United
States.
H.R. 319, 106th Cong. (1999). The formulation of this act is arguably more
nefarious than H.R. 73, which only seeks to define another act of Congress. H.R.
319, on the other hand, is an attempt to alter the definition of the Constitution,
under the enforcement clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The enforcement
clause, however, is limited to implementing the Fourteenth Amendment, not
altering the substantive rights conferred thereunder. See Kimel, 120 S. Ct. at 644;
City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 519. In light of accepted common law principles that
have become part and parcel of the Citizenship Clause's jurisprudence, see United
States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 659 (1898), there is no constitutional basis
for H.R. 319 because it seeks to substantively alter a right secured under the
Fourteenth Amendment, namely citizenship.
195.
See U.S. CONST. art. V (establishing requirements for amending the
constitution).
196.
See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) (stating
that a "law repugnant to the constitution is void" and it is "the province and duty
of the judicial department to say what the law is").
197.
521 U.S. 507 (1997).
198.
See id. at 519; see also Kimel, 120 S. Ct. at 644. As discussed, supra
notes 175-76, Congress does have the authority to enforce the provisions of the
Fourteenth Amendment. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5. While this power is
broad, the federal enforcement power is limited to remedying and deterring state
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the Fourteenth Amendment. Efforts to legislatively alter the
Fourteenth Amendment can be distinguished from Congress'
plenary authority under the Naturalization Clause and
immigration power, where the role of the judiciary is deferential to
Congress' exercise of power. 19 9 These bills are so contrary to the
constitutional republic and established principles of citizenship
common law that 0they
could not survive judicial scrutiny should
2 0
they become law.
Legislative efforts to redefine the Citizenship Clause are in
excess of the enforcement power conferred under § 5 of the
20 1
Fourteenth Amendment and are therefore unconstitutional.
However, another option would be to amend the Fourteenth
20 2
Amendment to obviate territorial birthright citizenship.
Indeed, this is precisely what some commentators and political
leaders

suggest. 20 3

presidential

Former

candidate

Pete

California governor

Wilson

and

promoted,

1996

though

governments from violating the rights secured under § 1 of the Fourteenth
Amendment. See Kimel, 120 S. Ct. at 644. Congressional efforts to redefine the
text of the Citizenship Clause, however, do not comport to the remedial or
prophylactic character of the Enforcement Clause; rather, these efforts are
substantive alterations to a constitutional protection.
As such, they are
constitutionally infu-m and cannot be sustained from constitutional challenge.
199. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4; see also Nishimura v. Eldu, 142 U.S.
651, 659 (1892) ("every sovereign nation has the power.., to forbid the entrance
of foreigners within its dominion. .. ").
200. See Marbury, 5 U.S. at 177 (noting 'the constitution is either a
superior, paramount law, unchangeableby ordinary means, or it is on a level with
ordinary legislative acts, and, like other acts, is alterable when the legislature
shall please to alter it"). The effect of these acts would be to reject 375 years of
territorial birthright citizenship. See generally United States v. Wong Kim Ark,
169 U.S. 649, 655-62 (1898) (accepting Calvin's Case as the basis of United
States' birthright citizenship law).
201.
See supra notes 175, 176, 196-98.
202. In 1999, Representative Mark Foley introduced a proposed
constitutional amendment to prevent children bom to illegal immigrant from being
granted birthright citizenship. H.J.R. 10 was introduced in the 106th Congress
and is reproduced in totality here:
SECTION 1. No person born in the United States after the date of the
ratification of this article shall be a citizen of the United States, or of any
State, on account of birth in the United States unless the mother or father
of the person is a citizen of the United States, is lawfully in the United
States, or has a lawful status under the immigration laws of the United
States, at the time of the birth.
SECTION 2. The Congress shall have power to enforce this article by
appropriate legislation.
H.J.R. 10, 106th Cong. (1999).
203.
See Stein & Bauer, supra note 5, at 130 (inferring that constitutional
amendment of birthright citizenship is a worthwhile option, but efforts to
legislatively alter the Citizenship Clause should be pursued first).
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20 4
unsuccessfully, this reformulation of the Citizenship Clause.

Despite significant support for this alternative, 20 5 the idea has
not taken hold. 20 6
Furthermore, it is not prudent to
fundamentally alter the Constitution when vigorous enforcement
of its other provisions, under the Naturalization Clause and
immigration authority, would achieve a similar effect.
Barring the unlikely passage of a constitutional amendment
abandoning territorial birthright citizenship, there are several
alternatives that attack the perceived problem without actually
affecting the status of children born to illegal immigrants. These
alternatives include strict prohibition of federal services to illegal
immigrants, stronger policing of borders, and expeditious
deportation of illegal immigrants.
These political solutions
require judicial deference to the legislature under the
Naturalization Clause and immigration authority, 20 7 and thus,
20 8
they are presumptively valid.
The Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility
Act of 1996 (IIRIRA) limits both the entrance of illegal immigrants
and the corresponding disbursement of public benefits for those
IIRIRA contains
in the country both legally and illegally. 20 9

204.

See Pete Wilson, Crack Down on Illegals, USA TODAY, Aug. 20, 1993, at

12A.
205.
See Note, The Birthright Citizenship Amendment: A Threat to Equality,
107 HARv. L. REV. 1026, 1026 n.9 (1994) (citing Bruce W. Nelan, Not Quite So
Welcome Anymore, TIME, Fall 1993, at 10, 12 (noting a study that indicated 49% of
Americans favored amending the constitution to abandon territorial birthright

citizenship)).
206.

A bill offered in the

103rd Congress

to amend the Fourteenth

Amendment never passed out of the House of Representatives. See H.J.R. Res.
129, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993). A similar proposed amendment is now in front
of the 106th Congress. See supranote 202 and accompanying text.
207. U.S. CONS'r. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
208.
See Miller v. Albright, 523 U.S. 420, 434-35 n.11 (1998) (recognizing
traditional deference to the legislature and executive in the area of immigration
policy); see also League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Wilson, 908 F. Supp. 755,
768 (C.D. Cal. 1995) (finding California Ballot Proposition 187, which prohibited
illegal immigrants from receiving state social welfare benefits, unconstitutional
because, among other reasons, "the federal government possesses the exclusive
power to regulate immigration" and this power is embodied in the "plenary
authority" of Congress under the Naturalization Clause, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.
4) (emphasis added); Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 225 (1981) (noting Congressional
power in the area of immigration is "plenary" and therefore, the "need for delicate
policy judgments has counseled the Judicial Branch to avoid intrusion into this
field").
209. Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-546 (1996) (codified as amended
in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.). See generally IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION
SERVICE, U.S.
IMMIGRANT

DEPt OF JUSTICE, SUMMARY: ILLEGAL IMMIGRATION REFORM AND
ACT OF 1996 (revised 1997) (hereinafter IIRIRA

RESPONSIBILITY

SUMMARY). Receipt of public benefits requires proof of citizenship, and verification
of immigration status is required for Social Security and higher education
assistance. See IIRIRA SUMMARY at 3.
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provisions for expedited deportation of aliens engaged in fraud or
misrepresentation,
with exceptions for aliens who fear
persecution or intend to apply for asylum. 2 10 Additionally, IIRIRA
creates a higher threshold for the lawful admission of immigrants,
placing the burden on the immigrant to show admissibility into
211
the United States.
In addition to reforming immigration procedures, the federal
government's recent reform of welfare places restrictions on illegal
2 12
immigrants' ability to receive federal welfare benefits.
Generally, under the Personal
Responsibility and Work
Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, illegal immigrants are
denied
"any retirement, welfare,
health,
disability,
food

assistance, or unemployment benefits."2 1 3

Thus, those who

oppose birthright citizenship for children born to illegal
immigrants because it opens the door to social welfare services
should take note that such a basis for objecting to birthright
citizenship, while not illusory, is surely diminished.
These
measures are presumptively valid because the Supreme Court
has consistently affirmed Congress' expansive power to regulate
immigration and the receipt of public benefits.2 14 Congress may,

210. See id. at 4 (amending § 235(b)(1) of the Immigration and
Naturalization Act (INA)). The expedited deportation procedure pertains to
circumstances when the illegal immigrant gains admission without valid travel
documents or when fraudulent documents are used. See IMMIGRATION AND
NATURALIZATION SERVICE, U.S. DEPT OF JUSTICE, FACT SHEET: ILLEGAL IMMIGRATION
REFORM AND IMMIGRANT RESPONSIBILITY ACT OF 1996 Expedited Removal Proceeding
(revised 1997) (hereinafter IIRIRA FACT SHEET). This procedure also applies in
circumstances when the illegal immigrant uses fraudulent documents to receive
state or federal social services. See id. All non-expedited removal proceedings are
unified under the IIRIRA with narrower forms of relief from removal. See id.
211. See id., Grounds of Inadmissibility.
212. See generally Jeffrey L. Katz, For the Record: Welfare Overhaul Law,
CONG. Q. 2696 (Sept. 21, 1996) (discussing the Personal Responsibility and Work
Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105
(1996)).
213. Id. at 2701. There are exceptions to this general rule. For example,
illegal immigrants may receive emergency medical services under Medicaid;
likewise, immunization for communicable diseases is also exempted. See id. Nonemergency prenatal and delivery care, however, are not exempted. See id. State
governments are prohibited from providing state or local benefits to illegal
immigrants, unless the state enacts a law after August 22, 1996 explicitly allowing
illegal immigrants to receive benefits. See id.
214.
See Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471,
486 (1999) (noting "many of the provisions of IIRIRA are aimed at protecting the
Executive's discretion from the courts-indeed, that can fairly be said to be the
theme of the legislation"); Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 80 (1976) (noting "the
fact that Congress has provided some welfare for citizens does not require it to
provide like benefits for all aliens"). There is no constitutional obligation for
Congress to provide any benefit to illegal immigrants, or its own citizens for that
matter, and equal protection is not violated by discriminating against illegal
immigrants in prohibiting their receipt of welfare benefits. See id. (finding no
"illegal immigrant can advance even a colorable constitutional claim to a share in
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in fact, "withhold its beneficence from those whose very presence
within the United States is the product of their own unlawful
2 15
conduct."
Stricter enforcement of border controls is another alternative
to abolition of territorial birthright citizenship. By halting illegal
immigrant parents before they enter the United States, there
would be a corresponding reduction in births. Between 1991 and
1994, the Immigration and Naturalization Service's Border Patrol
apprehended 4,878,502 illegal immigrants. 2 16
This level of
apprehension represents a ten-fold increase between 1965 and
1994 and suggests a corresponding increase in the number of
illegal immigrants entering the United States. 2 17
While the
precise number of illegal immigrants who enter the United States
undetected is unknown, 2 18 increasing Border Patrol agents'
presence on the borders would undoubtedly increase the number
of apprehensions. 2 19
In fact, the Border Patrol received an
appropriation of $3.9 billion in 1999, which was partially used to
enhance the border patrol ranks with 1000 new agents devoted to
220
apprehension.
Finally, a more assertive deportation procedure could be
utilized to remove illegal immigrants already in the United
States. 2 2 1 Like other areas of immigration policy delegated to

the bounty that a conscientious sovereign makes available to its own citizens and
some of its guests"); see also Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 219 n.19 (1981)
(rejecting the notion that illegal immigrant are a "suspect class" deserving of strict
scrutiny because "entry into this class, by virtue of entry into this country, is the
product of voluntary action... [in fact] entry into this class is a crime").
215. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 219 n.19. Of course, the problem perceived by
critics of territorial birthright citizenship is that despite a parent's status, citizen
children are entitled to welfare benefits.
216. See BRIGGS, supra note 183, at 157.
217. See id. at 155. Apprehension data must be viewed critically because
this data contains multiple counts for repeat captures of the same individual. Id.
Additionally, this data does not represent the number of those individuals who
enter the country unbeknownst to the INS. See id.
218.
See id.
219.
See Bunis & Garcia, supra note 182.
220.
See id.
221. In 1997, the INS deported 169,072 illegal aliens. See David G. Savage,
Ruling Eases Way for Deportation of Illegal Immigrants, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 25, 1999,
at Al. The Supreme Court noted the lackluster results of deportation in Plyler.
See 457 U.S. at 218 (1981) (noting "lax enforcement of the laws barring entry into
this country, coupled with the failure to establish an effective bar to the
employment of undocumented aliens" has led to increases in illegal immigrants
entering the United States). The problem is certainly one of enforcement, though
recent efforts under IIRIRA are attempting to stave the enforcement problem, in
the past presidential administrations have placed deportation on the backburner.
See id. at 219 n. 17 (quoting comments made by then-Attorney General William F.
Smith to the House of Representative and the Senate that "[w]e have neither the
resources, the capability, nor the motivation to uproot and deport millions of illegal
aliens, many of whom have become ... members of the community") (emphasis
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Congress under the Constitution, the judiciary has shown
deference to the policy decisions of Congress. 2 22 Under the
Immigration and Naturalization Act, 2 23 deportation of illegal
224
immigrants is under the purview of the Attorney General.
Furthermore, determination of an immigrant's status is within
225
the exclusive jurisdiction of the INS and immigration judges.
The plenary nature of Congress' deportation power was reaffirmed
in the 1999 case, Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination

Committee.22 6 Writing for an eight-to-one majority, Justice Scalia
upheld a provision of IIRIRA prohibiting judicial review of any
cause of action arising under the Attorney General's discretion
over certain non-final-order deportation decisions and actions of
2
the INS.

27

With such plenary power under the Naturalization Clause
and immigration authority, Congress has the power to scrutinize
more closely whether children are born of illegal immigrants. If
so, the illegal immigrant parents could be deported

added)); see also Bill Piatt, Born as Second Class Citizens in the U.S.A.: Children of
Undocumented Parents, 63 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 35, 40-41 (1988) (noting that
.citizen children . . . have not been successful in pressing the view that the
deportation of their undocumented parents is tantamount to the de facto
deportation of the child").
222. See Miller v. Albright, 523 U.S. 420, 450 (1998) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring) (recognizing "[j]udicial power over immigration and naturalization is
extremely limited"); Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 792 (1977) (finding that precedent
had "long recognized power to expel or exclude aliens as a fundamental sovereign
attribute exercised by the Government's political departments largely immune
from judicial control"); see also Schulman, supranote 157, at 679 (citing Hampton
v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88, 101-02 n.21 (1976)); Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408
U.S. 753, 770 (1972)) (noting the civil penalty of deportation is subject to limited
judicial review).
223.
See8 U.S.C. § 1101 etseq. (1994).
224. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1227, 1252 (Supp. II 1996).
225. See id. § 1252(b).
226. 525 U.S. 471 (1999).
227. See id. at 488-9 1. The relevant section of IIRIRA, § 1252(g), reads:
Except as provided in this section and notwithstanding any other provision
of law, no court shall have jurisdiction to hear any cause or claim by or on
behalf of any alien arising from the decision or action by the Attorney
General to commence proceedings, adjudicate cases, or execute removal
orders against any alien under this Act.
8 U.S.C. § 1252(g) (Supp. 11 1996). According to the Court, the common sense
rationale for this rule is to prevent abusive delay in the deportation procedure by
illegal immigrants who use judicial review of every adverse ruling by the INS to
perpetuate their remaining in the United States. See Reno, 525 U.S. at 490
(noting "the consequence of delay.., in deportation proceedings ... is to permit
and prolong a continuing violation of United States law" and "[p]ostponing
justifiable deportation . . . is often the principle object of resistance to a
deportation proceeding" by the illegal immigrants).
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accordingly. 22 8 Undoubtedly, this is a tremendously harsh rule
for children of illegal immigrants born in the United States. It
would force them either to dissociate themselves from their
parents to accept the benefits of U.S. citizenship or to remove
themselves from the country where their citizenship inheres to
remain with their family. Some statutory relief does exist,
however, for citizen children facing this problem. 2 29 The relief
consists of suspending deportation and adjusting the status of
illegal immigrant parents to that of a "lawfully admitted
permanent resident. "23 0 This relief requires the illegal immigrant
to have physical presence in the United States for seven years
prior to seeking the relief and is supplementary to the
requirement of "good moral character."2 3 1 Additionally, the illegal
immigrant must demonstrate that deportation would result in
"extreme hardship."23 2 While courts may be sympathetic to the
hardship imposed on the citizen child by deporting the illegal
immigrant parent, 2 3 3 mere assertion of a negative impact on the
citizen child does not itself establish the extreme hardship
necessary to cease the deportation. 2 3 4 The Supreme Court has
held that the INS has the power to narrowly construe the extreme
hardship clause should they deem it wise to do so, and the courts
generally do not encroach on that authority. 2 35 Thus, apparently,
is subject to the plenary power of the
even this relief measure
23 6
branches.
political
These alternatives underscore the pivotal political issues
territorial birthright citizenship opponents recognize but seek to

The fact that the child is a citizen has not been found by the courts to
228.
require cessation of their parent's deportation. See Acosta v. Gaiffney, 558 F.2d
1153, 1158 (3d Cir. 1977) (noting that the citizen child of illegal immigrants does
not have her constitutional rights violated by the deportation of her parents).
Deportation proceedings should not be halted because of a citizen child's birth to
the illegal immigrant parents. See id. This would "open a loophole in the
immigration laws for the benefit of those deportable aliens who have had a child
born while they were here." Id.
See 8 U.S.C. § 1254(a)(1) (1994).
229.
Id.
230.
231.
Id.
See id. The extreme hardship criterion may be established by either
232.
demonstrating the hardship effects on the alien or to the alien's citizen children.
See Piatt, supranote 221, at 41; see also Schulman, supranote 157, at 701 (citing
Cerrillo-Perez v. INS, 809 F.2d 1419, 1222 (9th Cir. 1987)).
See WanA v. INS, 622 F.2d 1341, 1346-47 (9th Cir. 1980) (arguing that
233.
hardship requires the inquiry be broadened to look at the effects of deportation on
other persons), rev'd on other grounds, 450 U.S. 139 (1981).
Id. at 1348 (noting that removal of the citizen child from the United
234.
States is not sufficient to establish the requisite level of hardship).
See id. at 1344-45 (holding that the Attorney General and his delegates
235.
have authority, under the immigration and naturalization power, to define the
phrase "extreme hardship").
See id.
236.
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Legislation defining the

Citizenship Clause will ultimately fail, either in the legislative
arena or by judicial review. 2 3 7
Given the Supreme Court's
current common law interpretation of the Citizenship Clause,
only efforts within Congress' plenary jurisdiction under the
Naturalization Clause and immigration power will yield the
outcome desired by opponents of territorial birthright citizenship.
Thus, any effort to reduce the costs associated with births in the
United States to illegal immigrants will require an attack
collateral to the Citizenship Clause, by legislating to enforce
border policing, restricting benefits, and expediting deportation.
Whether IIRIRA's terms will reduce the flow of illegal
immigrants and the corresponding birth of their children within
the territorial jurisdiction of the United States has yet to be
determined.
This effort, however, illustrates a procedure for
dealing with the concerns of opponents of territorial birthright
citizenship without treading on the constitutional framework by
directly assaulting the Fourteenth Amendment. Alterations of the
benefit structure and increased border enforcement are the best
methods for restricting births within the United States. This is
due to the Supreme Court's consistent affirmation of Congress'
expansive power to regulate immigration and the receipt of public
benefits.
Several obstacles, however, limit the broad power of Congress
under its authority to control the borders.
Constitutionally,
Congress and the states may not deprive non-citizens under their
respective jurisdictions of the equal protection of the laws; nor
may non-citizens' due process rights be denied. 238
Thus, the
term "persons" in the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments has
been found to include non-citizens, even if present in the country
illegally. 2 39
While due process and equal protection concerns

237. See supranotes 175-76, 196-98 and accompanying text.
238. See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 212 (1981) (noting the equal protection
and due process provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment "are universal in their
application, to all persons within the territorial jurisdiction"); Mathews v. Diaz,
426 U.S. 67, 77 (1976) (finding that the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments protect
"every one of these persons from deprivation of life, liberty, or property without
due process of law ....

[ejven one whose presence in this country is unlawful")

(emphasis added); Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33, 48-51 (1950)
(holding disaffirmed legislativelyfor other reasons, 64 Stat. 1044, 1048); Yick Wo v.
Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369 (1886) (finding the Equal Protection and Due Process
clauses "are universal in their application, to all persons within the territorial
jurisdiction, without regard to any differences . . . of nationality") (emphasis
added); see also Statement of Senator Jacob Howard, CONG. GLoBE, 38th Cong.,
1st Sess. 2765 (1866) (describing the Fourteenth Amendment's protection as
applying not "merely [to] a citizen of the United States, but to any person...").
239. U.S. CONST. amends. V & XIV; see also Plyler, 457 U.S. at 210 (noting
"even aliens whose presence in this country is unlawful, have long been
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serve to limit application of the Naturalization Clause and
congressional immigration authority, the standard of scrutiny is
24°
So while
more deferential than for traditional suspect classes.
due process and equal protection will apply to illegal aliens, the
national
scope of this protection is itself limited because the
241
government has vast inherent power over immigration.
The practical obstacle of limited resources decreases the
appeal of using the plenary power of the political branches under
the Naturalization Clause and immigration authority. The Court
has taken judicial notice of the costs associated with aggressive
enforcement. 2 4 2 Likewise, executive agencies are aware of the
high costs of energetic enforcement. 2 4 Decisively, the issue of
whether the resources exist with which to provide spirited
immigration authority enforcement is undermined by an inability
and unwillingness by Congress and executive enforcement
branches to halt illegal immigration and the attendant result of
reduced births by illegal immigrants. 2 4 Part of the reason for
this course of inaction is that some see a tolerable level of illegal

recognized as 'persons' guaranteed due process of law under the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments").
(noting Congress has
240.
See Curran, supra note 3, at 84 n.64
"tremendous latitude" in enacting immigration policies). In Plyler, the Court
found, for the purpose of striking down a state regulation under the Fourteenth
Amendment Due Process Clause, that illegal immigrants were not a suspect class
and, therefore, strict scrutiny did not apply. 457 U.S. at 219 n.19.
241.
See id. (noting that "alienage classifications may be intimately related
to the conduct of foreign policy, to the federal prerogative to control access to the
United States, and to the plenary federal power to determine who has sufficiently
manifested his allegiance to become a citizen of the Nation').
242.
See Reno v. American Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471,
490 (1999) (noting the IIRIRA's removal of court jurisdiction for certain non-finalorders was to streamline the deportation procedure, ultimately leading to reduced
costs); see also Plyler, 457 U.S. at 218-219 (noting the government has permitted
a pervasive "shadow population" of illegal immigrants due to "sheer incapability

and lax enforcement").
See Reno, 525 U.S. at 490 Prior to enactment of IIRIRA, the INS
243.
regularly used its discretion to abandon deportation proceeding for "humanitarian

reasons or simply for its own convenience." Id. at 484 n.8 (noting the INS had
abandonment guidelines that included factors such as whether the proceeding
would generate bad publicity for the INS); see also Plyler, 457 U.S. at 219 n.17
(discussing comments by former Attorney General William Smith that "we [the
INS] have neither the resources . . . nor the motivation to uproot an deport
millions of illegal aliens').
244. While prior inaction was due to unwillingness by enforcement agencies
to strictly uphold immigration laws, the trend may be changing. Recently, 1,700
illegal immigrants were fired in Washington state due to an INS documentation
audit. See Kim Murphy, INS' Fighton Illegal Labor is Big Joltfor Yakima Valle, L.A.
TIMES, Feb. 26, 1999, at Al. The INS has also recently targeted employers in
Nebraska, Seattle, Florida, and San Francisco. See id. The illegal immigrants,
after they are fired, however, are not deported. See id. In 1996 documentation
audits resulted in the firing of 21,217 illegal immigrants in seven states in the
western region. See id.
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immigrants as a net benefit to the United States, though this
assertion is heavily disputed by critics of territorial birthright
citizenship. 2 45 Illegal immigrants are frequently characterized as
a source of "cheap" labor, whose "presence is tolerated" or
2 46
perhaps even welcomed.
Thus, a tension exists. The goals of restricting territorial
birthright citizenship and reducing the net costs to the United
States associated with children born of illegal immigrants are
potentially outweighed by the increased cost of achieving that
goal by constitutionally permissible means, such as increased
border patrol efforts, expedited deportation, and reduced social
welfare benefits. Unlike efforts to legislatively repeal territorial
birthright citizenship, however, these alternatives are the result of
majoritarian policy decisions in an area the courts have found to
and
power-naturalization
Congress' exclusive
be within
immigration.
C. The PracticalDifferences Between the British and
American Systems
The starkest contrast between the United Kingdom and the
United States is the differing constitutional methodology for
enacting change in the concept of territorial birthright citizenship.
The United Kingdom's abandonment of territorial birthright
citizenship, long recognized in the common law, was the result of
24 7
Though the structure
Parliament's constitutional supremacy.
of parliamentary supremacy is inherently different from the
separation of powers and congressional Fourteenth Amendment
§ 5 enforcement authority models, the United Kingdom's
abandonment of territorial birthright citizenship is similarly
based in the political volatility due to increases in illegal entries
2 48
into the United Kingdom.

245. See Reno, 525 U.S. at 484-85; Plyler, 457 U.S. at 219 n. 17.
246. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 219 n. 17 (quoting former Attorney General William
Smith's comments to Congress). Until 1964, a temporary worker program, known
as the Bracero Program, operated to augment shortages in the domestic United
States workforce in factories and agriculture. See Schulman, supra note 157, at
684-85. The Bracero Program and the current illegal immigrant population often
work in sectors of the economy where citizen workers are unwilling to work. See
id. at 685 n.106.
247.

See HOLDSWORTH, supra note 128, at 186; see also Wilson, supra note

33, at 590.
See generally Wilson, supra note 33, at 567-75 (discussing the
248.
abandonment of territorial birthright citizenship in the United Kingdom as a result
of anti-immigrant tension).
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permit

legislative alteration of the Constitution. 2 4 9 The United States
could use the Naturalization Clause and immigration power to
achieve a result similar to the United Kingdom, while not formally
amending the Citizenship Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The result would affect the aspects of territorial birthright
citizenship with which critics are actually concerned: increased
costs in the social welfare system. To this end, recent U.S.
legislation applies this theory. 2 S° Energetic implementation by
the executive enforcement branches is required.
However,
enforcement of existing policies, to the extent that enforcement
would accomplish the desired effect opponents of territorial
birthright citizenship seek, would require the expenditure of
precious resources. 25 1 This expenditure may be a greater cost
25 2
than the effort is worth to ameliorate critics' desires.
Thus, the ultimate practical difference between legislative
curbs in the United Kingdom and the United States is that the
United Kingdom can constitutionally attack territorial birthright
citizenship directly. The United States, on the other hand, must
resort to collateral legislative efforts, requiring substantial, and
perhaps prohibitive, costs.

IV.

CONCLUSION: SHOULD THE UNITED STATES DENY

CITIZENSHIP TO CHILDREN OF ILLEGAL IMMIGRANTS?

The answer to the question presented in the heading above is
25 3
"No," because common law concepts, though ambiguous,
militate toward recognizing territorial birthright citizenship in
children of illegal immigrants in the United States. While the

249. This would violate separation of powers and the concept of judicial
review. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1804). Additionally,
any effort to alter the constitutional definition of citizenship in the Fourteenth
Amendment would be unconstitutional under Boerne v. Flores because while
Congress may not alter the substantive nature of the rights secured under the
Fourteenth Amendment, 521 U.S. 507, 519, 536 (1997), it certainly may not use
its enforcement power to remove constitutional protections that already exist.

Nothing could be farther from the intent of § 5s enforcement power, which was
incorporated into the Fourteenth Amendment to provide Congress with authority
to protect the secured rights against state governments who were hostile to the
concept of equal rights for all. See Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 120 S. Ct. 631,
644 (2000) (discussing the scope of Congress' enforcement power).
250. See generally IIRIRA, Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-546 (1996);
Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub. L.
No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (1996).
251. See discussion supranotes 242-46 and accompanying text.
252. See id.
253. See Drimmer, supra note 5, at 671; see also Stein & Bauer, supra note
S, at 128.
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United Kingdom's system of governance sanctions fundamental
changes in its constitution by acts of Parliament, 25 4 the U.S.
Constitution precludes legislative fiat of the judicial function to
For this reason,
define the Constitution's meaning.25 5
Congressional efforts to abandon the Fourteenth Amendment's
territorial birthright citizenship regime are unconstitutional. This
can be contrasted with the United Kingdom's renunciation of
territorial birthright citizenship after 375 years. 25 6 In opting for
British citizenship based on parentage, the United Kingdom
repudiated the territorial basis of common law birthright
citizenship, a principle to which the United States still adheres.
It would be far more efficacious and constructive for
opponents of territorial birthright citizenship to concentrate their
efforts on altering current immigration and border enforcement
policies. Rather than pursuing patently unconstitutional efforts
to redefine the Citizenship Clause, use of the Naturalization
Clause and immigration power would offer presumptively valid
alternatives. Also, because curbing illegal immigration is part of a
mainstream political agenda, such efforts would be more likely to
receive bipartisan support and the support of the American
public.
absent
Clause,
Citizenship
the
Direct assault on
A
more
power.
Congress'
not
within
is
amendment,
constitutional
energetic use of the Naturalization Clause and immigration
authority, however, may be a better implement with which to
stem the flow of illegal immigrants and the associated births
within the United States. Nevertheless, energetic use of the
Naturalization Clause and immigration power carries its own
Limited resources and inconclusive cost-benefit
problems.
analysis suggest a plausible conclusion that expending resources
to eradicate costs may actually be greater than the cost itself.
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254. See HOLDWORTH, supra note 128, at 186.
See Marbury, 5 U.S. at 177.
255.
256. SeeBNA, ch. 61.
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